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I. Introduction 
Two different borrowers, the Sherzers and Ms. McOmie-
Gray, took nearly identical actions to rescind their refinanced 
loans.1 However, because federal circuits have split regarding 
how a borrower can exercise rescission, the Sherzers’ actions 
validly rescinded their loan while McOmie-Gray’s actions were 
deemed untimely.2  
                                                                                                     
 1. Compare Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 256 (3d Cir. 
2013) (stating that the Sherzers sent notice to and filed suit against the lender 
to exercise rescission), with McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 
1325, 1326–27 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that McOmie-Gray sent notice to and 
filed suit against the lender to exercise rescission). 
 2. See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 261 (holding that a borrower “exercises his 
right of rescission by sending the creditor valid written notice of rescission, and 
need not also file suit within the three-year period”); McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 
1326 (stating TILA “requir[es] dismissal of a claim for rescission brought more 
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The Truth in Lending Act (TILA)3 represents landmark 
legislation passed by Congress to regulate the lending market.4 
Under certain conditions, a borrower can rescind a qualifying 
loan within three years of loan consummation.5 McOmie-Gray 
qualified for TILA’s right of rescission.6 Accordingly, she felt the 
need to exercise her rescission right and gave her lender notice 
within three years of loan consummation.7 However, McOmie-
Gray filed suit three years and four months after loan 
consummation.8 Because McOmie-Gray filed suit after TILA’s 
three-year period, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit  
affirmed the dismissal of her case as untimely.9 
The Sherzers were given more time to file suit than McOmie-
Gray.10 The Sherzers also qualified for TILA’s right of rescission 
and they provided their lender with notice of rescission within 
three years of loan consummation.11 The Sherzers filed suit three 
years and three months after loan consummation.12 However, the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Sherzers 
                                                                                                     
than three years after the consummation of the loan . . . regardless of when the 
borrower sends notice of rescission”). Both cases will be discussed in further 
detail. See infra notes 115–33 and accompanying text (discussing both cases in 
the context of the circuit split). 
 3. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–65 (2012)). 
 4. See infra notes 37–39 and accompanying text (describing Congress’s 
stated purposes for passing TILA). 
 5. See infra notes 49–54 and accompanying text (discussing the three 
conditions that must be met under TILA for a borrower to have a rescission 
right). 
 6. McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326–27. 
 7. Id. at 1326. 
 8. See id. at 1326–27 (listing McOmie-Gray’s loan-consummation date as 
April 14, 2006, and McOmie-Gray’s lawsuit filing date as August 28, 2009). 
 9. See id. at 1329 (stating that “the district court properly dismissed this 
case as untimely”). 
 10. Compare Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 267 (3d Cir. 
2013) (permitting the Sherzers’ rescission suit three years and three months 
after loan consummation), with McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 
F.3d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 2012) (refusing McOmie-Gray’s rescission suit three 
years and four months after loan consummation). 
 11. Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 256. 
 12. See id. (listing the Sherzers’ loan-consummation date as August 26, 
2004 and the Sherzers’ lawsuit filing date as November 30, 2007). 
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validly exercised rescission via notice within TILA’s three-year 
period and therefore could file suit after that time.13 
McOmie-Gray and the Sherzers took similar rescission 
steps—both sent notice before but filed suit after TILA’s three-
year period.14 Yet because of opposing decisions supplied by the 
Ninth and Third Circuits, the rescission suits resulted in 
dramatically different results.15 This Note reviews these two 
opposing approaches to how a borrower exercises TILA’s right of 
rescission. This Note argues that courts should not permit 
rescinding borrowers to file suit after TILA’s three-year period 
because doing so would upset the balance between each party’s 
rights in the borrower–lender relationship.16 Stated differently, 
permitting a rescinding borrower to file suit after TILA’s three-
year period becomes the nuclear option—borrowers would have a 
disproportionate amount of power in the borrower–lender 
relationship, thus upsetting the balance.17 Choosing this nuclear 
option results in severe consequences for all parties involved in 
the lending market.18 
Part II examines the history of TILA, with an emphasis on 
the statute’s right of rescission.19 Part III reviews the two 
                                                                                                     
 13. See id. at 267 (holding that “the District Court erred as a matter of law 
when it dismissed the Sherzers’ complaint as untimely”). 
 14. See supra notes 7–8, 11–12 and accompanying text (providing the 
nearly identical actions taken by the Sherzers and McOmie-Gray). 
 15. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (comparing the Third 
Circuit’s decision that allowed a borrower to file a rescission suit three years 
after loan consummation with the Ninth Circuit’s decision that refused to allow 
a borrower to file a rescission suit three years after loan consummation). 
 16. See infra notes 291–95 and accompanying text (accepting the Notice-
and-Filing Approach because it maintains the balance in the borrower–lender 
relationship). Note that I have labeled the two approaches adopted by federal 
circuits as the “Notice-Only Approach” and the “Notice-and-Filing Approach.” 
Both approaches will be defined and discussed in further detail. See infra notes 
109–12 and accompanying text (discussing both approaches and providing a 
representative case for each). 
 17. See infra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (rejecting the Notice-
Only Approach because it upsets the balance in the borrower–lender 
relationship). 
 18. See infra notes 262–65 and accompanying text (describing how the 
Notice-Only Approach increases costs for lenders, who will pass on those costs to 
borrowers by increasing the prices associated with lending transactions). 
 19. See infra notes 23–93 and accompanying text (discussing TILA’s history 
and the right of rescission). 
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approaches that have emerged from the circuit split concerning 
how borrowers validly exercise TILA’s right of rescission.20 
Finally, Part IV examines the arguments surrounding the two 
approaches21 and recommends that courts adopt the approach 
that limits a borrower’s ability to file suit to TILA’s prescribed 
three-year period.22 
II. A Brief History of TILA’s Right of Rescission 
Congress sought to address consumer rights by enacting 
TILA—a “corner stone of consumer credit legislation.”23 This Part 
first describes, in general terms, the lending market before 
TILA’s implementation.24 Second, this Part provides an overview 
of the purpose and legislative history of TILA.25 Third, this Part 
explains the context in which TILA’s right of rescission can be 
exercised.26 Fourth, this Part reviews Regulation Z, a regulation 
promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board that interprets TILA’s 
rescission provision.27 Finally, this Part discusses Beach v. Ocwen 
Federal Bank,28 the only Supreme Court case addressing TILA’s 
right of rescission.29 
                                                                                                     
 20. See infra notes 94–139 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit 
split). 
 21. See infra notes 145–279 and accompanying text (analyzing the 
arguments and counterarguments for both approaches). 
 22. See infra Part IV.C (rejecting the Notice-Only Approach and 
recommending the Notice-and-Filing Approach). 
 23. ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN KEEST, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 
TRUTH IN LENDING § 1.1.1 (5th ed. 2003).  
 24. See infra notes 30–36 and accompanying text (discussing the pre-TILA 
lending market). 
 25. See infra notes 37–47 and accompanying text (discussing TILA 
generally). 
 26. See infra notes 48–63 and accompanying text (discussing TILA’s right 
of rescission). 
 27. See infra notes 64–75 and accompanying text (discussing Regulation Z). 
 28. 523 U.S. 410 (1998). 
 29. See infra notes 76–93 and accompanying text (discussing Beach). 
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A. The Pre-TILA Lending Market 
Before TILA, state laws governed consumer credit and 
lending markets.30 These assorted state laws lacked uniformity 
and were poorly enforced, rendering them largely ineffective.31 
Another problem concerned the effect of the state laws: they were 
reactive, rather than proactive, in providing borrowers with some 
relief.32 Further complicating matters, creditors used a variety of 
methods to calculate interest rates and to decide which additional 
charges, such as credit-investigation and loan-processing fees,33 
were incorporated into those rates.34 Due to this lack of 
uniformity, consumers could not effectively “comparison shop for 
credit.”35 In essence, the pre-TILA lending market created a 
“buyer beware” relationship between the borrower and lender 
because the borrower lacked meaningful protection measures.36  
                                                                                                     
 30. See David Smith & Gregg Stevens, The Impact of TILA on the Debtor–
Creditor Relationship, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 296, 297 (2007) (“Prior to 
the TILA, the laws governing consumer credit varied greatly from state to 
state . . . .”). 
 31. See id. (stating the state laws “varied greatly” and were “ineffective due 
to being poorly enforced, cumbersome, or unrealistic in light of America’s 
increasing reliance on credit” (footnote omitted)).  
 32. See id. (“[W]hile an overburdened debtor could avail himself of 
bankruptcy, that form of debtor relief itself did nothing to address problems that 
might exist on the front-end of the purchase or in the decision to use credit.”). 
 33. See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 23, § 1.1.2 (referencing Senator Paul 
Douglas’s concern over “camouflaging of credit by loading . . . exorbitant fees for 
credit life insurance, excessive fees for credit investigation, and all sorts of loan 
processing fees”). 
 34. See id. § 1.1.1 (“[C]onsumers had no easy way to determine how much 
credit would really cost, or how to compare among various creditors. Creditors 
did not use a uniform way of calculating interest, or a single system for defining 
what additional charges would be included in the interest rate . . . .”). 
 35. See Lea Krivinskas Shepard, It’s All About the Principal: Preserving 
Consumers’ Right of Rescission Under the Truth in Lending Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 
171, 184–85 (2010) (“Before TILA, consumers found it difficult or impossible to 
comparison shop for credit . . . .”).  
 36. See Smith & Stevens, supra note 30, at 296 (describing the borrower–
lender relationship before TILA as “buyer beware” because of a “variety of 
historically-failed or at best costly and partially-effective debtor protection 
measures” (footnotes omitted)). 
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B. The Truth in Lending Act 
In response, Congress passed TILA in 1968.37 TILA broadly 
applies to most consumer-credit transactions.38 TILA’s stated 
purpose is to promote credit comparison shopping for consumers, 
to avoid the “uninformed use of credit,” and to prevent inaccurate 
and unfair credit practices.39 To achieve this purpose, TILA 
standardizes credit measurements40 and requires lenders to make 
specified disclosures to borrowers.41 Specifically, lenders must 
provide certain material disclosures, including the terms of the 
loan, finance charges, and the borrower’s rights.42 Noncompliant 
                                                                                                     
 37. See Jonathan M. Landers & Ralph J. Rohner, A Functional Analysis of 
Truth in Lending, 26 UCLA L. REV. 711, 713 (1979) (“The basic premises of 
TIL[A] were that consumers needed certain information to make essential 
decisions in consumer credit transactions and that the information then 
available . . . was inadequate.”); RENUART & KEEST, supra note 23, § 1.2.1 
(describing TILA as “landmark legislation” that “marked the birth of modern 
consumer legislative activism”). 
 38. See RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH IN LENDING ¶ 1.01, at 2 
(Alvin C. Harrell ed., Supp. 2009) (“Applicable to virtually every form of 
consumer credit transaction—from home mortgages to small loans to credit card 
plans to even pawn transactions—the TIL Act commands nationwide uniformity 
of disclosure . . . .”); Shepard, supra note 35, at 185 (“TILA’s application is 
broad—ranging from open-end credit transactions like credit card and home 
equity loans to closed-end transactions like car loans and mortgages.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012). 
 40. See id. § 1605(a) (defining the “finance charge” as “the sum of all 
charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person to whom the credit is 
extended, and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to the 
extension of credit”); id. § 1606 (providing definitions of the “annual percentage 
rate” depending on the type of credit plan used); RENUART & KEEST, supra note 
23, § 1.1.1 (stating that TILA “prescribe[s] a uniform definition of what kinds of 
credit-related charges should be included when calculating the annual 
percentage rate, and requiring that the total cost of these charges be disclosed 
by dollar amount as the ‘finance charge’”); Shepard, supra note 35, at 185 
(“TILA provides a standardized definition of two key measurements of the cost 
of credit: the finance charge and the APR.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 41. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (“The creditor shall clearly and conspicuously 
disclose . . . the rights of the obligor . . . [and] appropriate forms for the obligor 
to exercise his right to rescind any transaction subject to this section.”); 
Shepard, supra note 35, at 185 (“TILA requires lenders to disclose to prospective 
consumer borrowers specific, standardized information about . . . credit 
transactions . . . .”). 
 42. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (listing required disclosures, such as the 
“finance charge” and the “identity of the creditor”); see also Beach v. Ocwen Fed. 
1932 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1925 (2014) 
lenders face both criminal43 and civil liability.44 Congress 
amended TILA in 1980,45 1995,46 and 200847 to make changes to 
the timing and substance of required disclosures, such as 
allowing more tolerance for minor errors made by the lender. 
C. TILA’s Right of Rescission 
In addition to damages, TILA provides some borrowers with 
another remedy: a right of rescission.48 Borrowers have a right of 
                                                                                                     
Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 412 (1998) (“[T]he Act requires creditors to provide 
borrowers with clear and accurate disclosures of terms dealing with things like 
finance charges, annual percentage rates of interest, and the borrower’s 
rights.”). 
 43. See 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (stating lenders who “willfully and knowingly” 
violate TILA are criminally liable and “shall be fined not more than $5,000 or 
imprisoned not more than one year, or both”). 
 44. See id. § 1640 (“[A]ny creditor who fails to comply . . . is liable to such 
person in an amount equal to . . . any actual damage sustained by such person 
as a result of the failure . . . .”); RENUART & KEEST, supra note 23, § 1.2.1 
(“Violations of these disclosure provisions subjected the creditor to civil suit for 
actual damages, statutory damages, and attorney fees, and could even cause 
criminal liability.”). 
 45. See Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-
221, 94 Stat. 168 (1980) (reducing the amount of TILA’s required disclosures 
and relaxing the strict liability standard for lender violations); Shepard, supra 
note 35, at 187 (stating that Congress amended TILA by passing the Truth in 
Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1980 because lender “compliance with 
the earliest version of the statute had become too difficult”). 
 46. See Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, 109 
Stat. 271 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (clarifying the 
content of TILA’s “finance charge” requirement and expanding the meaning of 
what constitutes an “accurate” finance charge); RENUART & KEEST, supra note 
23, § 6.1 (stating Congress amended TILA in 1995 to “reduc[e] the exposure of 
the mortgage lending industry to liability for extended rescission” by 
“provid[ing] greater tolerance for errors in certain disclosures”). 
 47. See Mortgage Disclosure Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
289, 122 Stat. 2855 (expanding the types of mortgage loans that lenders must 
provide TILA disclosures for and implementing waiting periods between the 
TILA disclosures and loan consummation); Jeff Sovern, Preventing Future 
Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection Law or How the Truth in 
Lending Act Failed the Subprime Borrowers, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 761, 816 (2010) 
(“In 2008, Congress amended TILA . . . . These amendments changed both the 
content and the timing of the disclosures; as for the timing . . . now lenders are 
obliged to let borrowers know of changes in key loan terms at least three days 
before the closing.” (footnote omitted)). 
 48. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012) (providing the borrower with a “right to 
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rescission under three conditions. First, the loan must be a 
“consumer credit transaction,” meaning the borrower is a natural 
person and the loan is for personal, household, or family 
purposes.49 TILA does not provide a right of rescission for 
corporate entities50 or for a loan used for business purposes.51 
Second, the loan must be secured with the borrower’s “principal 
dwelling.”52 Third, the loan cannot be a residential mortgage 
transaction.53 Accordingly, consumers cannot exercise a right of 
rescission for a first mortgage but can for nonpurchase 
transactions, such as home-equity loans, home-improvement 
credit sales, and refinancing.54 A borrower whose loan meets the 
statutory requirements has a right of rescission.55  
                                                                                                     
rescind the transaction” if certain conditions apply); Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 
523 U.S. 410, 412 (1998) (“Going beyond these rights to damages, the Act also 
authorizes a borrower . . . to rescind the loan transaction entirely . . . .”). 
 49. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (requiring a “consumer credit transaction”); id. 
§ 1602(i) (defining a “consumer credit transaction” as “one in which the party to 
whom credit is offered or extended is a natural person, and the money, property, 
or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, 
family, or household purposes”). 
 50. See id. § 1602(i) (implying that a corporation does not qualify for a right 
of rescission under TILA because the statute defines a “consumer” as a natural 
person). 
 51. See id. (“‘[C]onsumer,’ used with reference to a credit transaction, 
characterizes the transaction as one in which . . . the money, property, or 
services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, 
family, or household purposes.”); RENUART & KEEST, supra note 23, § 6.2.2 
(“[N]ot every transaction in which a lien is placed on a person’s home is covered. 
For example, a second mortgage placed on a home to obtain money to expand a 
business or for agricultural purposes will not be eligible for rescission.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 52. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); RENUART & KEEST, supra note 23, § 6.2.3 (“The 
second basic requirement for rescission rights to arise is that the transaction 
must involve a security interest in the consumer’s principal dwelling.”). 
 53. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(e)(1) (listing a “residential mortgage transaction” 
as an “exempted transaction” that does not include a right of rescission). 
 54. See Shepard, supra note 35, at 179 (“[A] consumer who has taken out a 
nonpurchase-money mortgage—through a home refinancing, home equity loan, 
or home improvement credit sale—has an absolute right to rescind the loan 
within three business days following the loan closing.” (footnotes omitted)); 
RENUART & KEEST, supra note 23, § 6.1 (“Home equity loans and home 
improvement credit sales are common examples of rescindable transactions.”). 
 55. See supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text (providing three 
conditions for rescission). 
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The consumer has an absolute right of rescission within 
three business days of the latest of the following: 
(1) consummation of the transaction,56 (2) delivery of the right to 
rescind notice, or (3) delivery of all required material 
disclosures.57 Congress believed this “cooling-off period”58 would 
provide the consumer with “the opportunity to reconsider any 
transaction which would have the serious consequence of 
encumbering the title” to their principal dwelling.59 If the lender 
fails to deliver one copy of the required material disclosures60 or 
two copies of the right to rescind notice,61 then § 1635(f) applies:  
An obligor’s right of rescission shall expire three years after 
the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale 
of the property, whichever occurs first, notwithstanding the 
fact that the information and forms required under this 
section or any other disclosures required under this part have 
not been delivered to the obligor . . . .62 
                                                                                                     
 56. See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 23, § 6.3.1 (stating consummation of 
the transaction occurs when “the consumer becomes contractually obligated on a 
credit transaction, which is determined by reference to state law” (footnote 
omitted)). Although the three-day rescission can be exercised after the latest of 
the three events listed, for simplistic purposes of this Note, I use “loan 
consummation” as the event that triggers the three-day rescission. 
 57. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012) 
[T]he obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction until 
midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the 
transaction or the delivery of the information and rescission forms 
required under this section together with a statement containing the 
material disclosures required under this subchapter, whichever is 
later, by notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the 
Bureau, of his intention to do so. 
 58. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 23, § 6.3.1. 
 59. S. REP. NO. 96-368, at 29 (1980); see also ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 
38, ¶ 8.01[1], at 598 (“Theoretically, during the three-day delay the consumer is 
to reflect on the wisdom and desirability of the contract and on the risk of 
possible loss of the home.”). 
 60. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (describing TILA’s required 
material disclosures); Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 411 (1998) 
(“[T]he borrower may rescind the loan agreement if the lender fails to deliver 
certain forms or to disclose important terms accurately.” (citation omitted)). 
 61. See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 23, § 6.4.1 (“All persons entitled to 
rescind . . . must receive two copies of the rescission notice and one copy of the 
material disclosures.” (footnote omitted)). 
 62. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). 
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Accordingly, the consumer’s right of rescission extends for three 
years after the loan’s consummation date.63 This extended right 
of rescission is the focus of this Note.  
D. Regulation Z 
Congress gave the Federal Reserve Board (Board) regulatory 
authority to implement TILA.64 Accordingly, the Board issued 
Regulation Z65 along with official staff interpretations.66 
Regulation Z is so named because the Board alphabetizes (rather 
than numberings) its regulations, and this particular regulation 
represents the twenty-sixth regulation implemented by the 
Board.67 Regulation Z has complex provisions that address topics 
such as computation of credit costs, disclosure of credit terms, 
and methods to resolve errors on credit accounts.68 Furthermore, 
Regulation Z’s stated purpose is “to promote the informed use of 
                                                                                                     
 63. See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 23, § 6.1 (“The rescission right is 
absolute for three days, but it may also last up to three years . . . if important 
TIL[A] disclosures were not provided correctly at the time of the original credit 
transaction.” (footnotes omitted)); supra note 56 and accompanying text (stating 
that the loan’s consummation date is determined under state law). Although the 
three-year rescission can be exercised after the latest of the two events listed, 
for simplistic purposes of this Note, I use “loan consummation” as the event that 
triggers the three-year rescission. 
 64. See Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146, 148 (1968) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2012)) (providing the Federal 
Reserve Board with the power to “prescribe regulations to carry out” TILA); 
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980) (“Congress 
delegated broad administrative lawmaking power to the Federal Reserve Board 
when it framed TILA.”). 
 65. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(a) (2010) (“This regulation, known as Regulation 
Z, is issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to 
implement the federal Truth in Lending Act . . . .”). 
 66. See id. § 226, supp. I (2010) (“This commentary is the vehicle by which 
the staff of the Division of Consumer and Community Affairs of the Federal 
Reserve Board issues official staff interpretations of Regulation Z.”). 
 67. See FRB: All Regulations, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/reglisting.htm#Z (last updated June 
30, 2014) (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (providing an alphabetized list of the 
Board’s regulations, which includes Regulation A–Regulation YY) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 68. See id. (stating that Regulation Z “[p]rescribes uniform methods for 
computing the cost of credit, for disclosing credit terms, and for resolving errors 
on certain types of credit accounts”). 
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consumer credit by requiring disclosures about its terms and 
cost.”69 Despite Regulation Z’s complexity, only the section 
concerning notice of TILA’s extended right to rescind pertains to 
this Note: 
To exercise the right to rescind, the consumer shall notify the 
creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram or other means of 
written communication. Notice is considered given when 
mailed, when filed for telegraphic transmission or, if sent by 
other means, when delivered to the creditor’s designated place 
of business.70  
Courts give deference to the Board’s interpretations of TILA and 
Regulation Z.71  
In response to the financial crisis that caused the Great 
Recession of 2007–2008, Congress created the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in 2010.72 The CFPB is an 
independent agency tasked with regulating consumer financial 
services and products.73 Congress transferred authority from 
seven federal agencies to the CFPB, including the Board’s 
previous authority to interpret and regulate under TILA.74 The 
                                                                                                     
 69. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b). 
 70. Id. § 226.23(a)(2). 
 71. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980) 
(“[D]eference is especially appropriate in the process of interpreting the Truth in 
Lending Act and Regulation Z. Unless demonstrably irrational, Federal Reserve 
Board staff opinions construing the Act or Regulation should be 
dispositive . . . .”). 
 72. See 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2012) (stating that Congress created the CFPB 
to “regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial products or services 
under the Federal consumer financial laws”); Leonard J. Kennedy et al., The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-
First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1142 (2012) (stating that Congress 
responded to the recent financial crisis by passing the Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank), which included the 
creation of the CFPB); Ronald J. Mann, After the Great Recession: Regulating 
Financial Services for Low- and Middle-Income Communities, 69 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 729, 732 (2012) (describing the new CFPB as a “breath of fresh air”). 
 73. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (stating that the CFPB will “implement” and 
“enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently” so that lending markets 
are “fair, transparent, and competitive”); Kennedy et al., supra note 72, at 1146 
(stating that Congress formed the CFPB “to regulate consumer financial 
products and services” as an independent federal agency). 
 74. See 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b)(1)(B) (“The [Consumer Financial Protection] 
Bureau shall have all powers and duties that were vested in the Board of 
Governors, relating to consumer financial protection functions, on the day before 
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CFPB reaffirmed Regulation Z by republishing it and expressing 
the intent to not change its substance.75 
E. Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank 
The Supreme Court addressed TILA’s right of rescission in 
Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank.76 In 1986, David and Linda Beach 
secured a construction loan to build a house.77 In the same year, 
the Beaches refinanced the loan.78 Five years later, the Beaches 
stopped making loan payments, and the bank foreclosed on the 
house.79 The Beaches argued that the bank failed to make 
required disclosures under TILA, and therefore, they could 
exercise the right of rescission.80 Although the Beaches conceded 
that the three-year period had already expired in 1989, they 
argued that the right of rescission could still be exercised as an 
affirmative “‘defense in recoupment’ to a collection action.”81 A 
recoupment defense allows a defendant to reduce, mitigate, or 
abate the damages claimed by the plaintiff if the defense and the 
                                                                                                     
the designated transfer date.”); Kennedy et al., supra note 72, at 1146 (stating 
that Congress consolidated the authority of seven federal agencies and 
transferred that authority the CFPB). 
 75. See Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 76 Fed. Reg. 79768-01 (Dec. 22, 
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026) (“In light of the transfer of the 
Board[’s] . . . rulemaking authority . . . to the Bureau, the Bureau is publishing 
for public comment an interim final rule . . . . This interim final rule does not 
impose any new substantive obligations on persons subject to the existing 
Regulation Z, previously published by the Board.”). 
 76. 523 U.S. 410, 411–12 (1998). 
 77. Id. at 413. 
 78. Id. The Beaches’ construction loan was a residential mortgage 
transaction that would not provide them with a right of rescission. See supra 
note 53 and accompanying text (stating a residential mortgage transaction is 
exempted from TILA). However, the Beaches refinanced this construction loan 
with another bank. Beach, 523 U.S. at 413. Because nonpurchase mortgages 
include home refinancing, the Beaches had a right of rescission under TILA. See 
supra note 54 and accompanying text (stating that a nonpurchase mortgage, 
such as home refinancing, gives the borrower a right of rescission). 
 79. Beach, 523 U.S. at 413. 
 80. See id. at 413–14 (“The Beaches . . . alleg[e] that the bank’s failure to 
make disclosures required by the Act gave them rights under §§ 1635 and 1640 
to rescind the mortgage agreement . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 81. Id. at 415. 
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plaintiff’s claim arise out of the same transaction.82 Furthermore, 
a recoupment defense can be asserted after the statute of 
limitations expires.83 
The Court considered whether the Beaches could exercise 
TILA’s extended right of rescission after the three-year period.84 
First, the Court acknowledged that generally a defendant could 
plead recoupment of damages as an affirmative defense even if 
the statute of limitations expired for an independent cause of 
action.85 The Court, however, concluded that the plain meaning of 
§ 1635(f), TILA’s rescission provision, indicates that it is not a 
statute of limitations: 
Section 1635(f), however, takes us beyond any question 
whether it limits more than the time for bringing a suit, by 
governing the life of the underlying right as well. The 
subsection says nothing in terms of bringing an action but 
instead provides that the “right of rescission [under the Act] 
shall expire” at the end of the time period. It talks not of a 
suit’s commencement but of a right’s duration, which it 
addresses in terms so straightforward as to render any 
limitation on the time for seeking a remedy superfluous. There 
is no reason, then, even to resort to the canons of construction 
that we use to resolve doubtful cases . . . .86 
                                                                                                     
 82. See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff § 5 (1995) 
(“[R]ecoupment allows a defendant to defend against a claim by asserting, up to 
the amount of the claim, the defendant’s own claim against the plaintiff growing 
out of the same transaction . . . . [R]ecoupment applies only by way of reduction, 
mitigation, or abatement of damages claimed by the plaintiff . . . .” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 83. See id. (“The defense of recoupment is not a counterclaim or setoff and 
therefore is not affected by a statute of limitations. Thus, a party may assert a 
claim for equitable recoupment, even though a timely counterclaim has not or 
cannot be filed.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 84. See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 415 (1998) (“[W]e granted 
certiorari to determine whether under federal law the statutory right of 
rescission provided by § 1635 may be revived as an affirmative defense after its 
expiration under § 1635(f).” (citation omitted)). 
 85. See id. (“[A] defendant’s right to plead ‘recoupment,’ a ‘defense arising 
out of some feature of the transaction upon which the plaintiff’s action is 
grounded,’ survives the expiration of the period provided by a statute of 
limitation that would otherwise bar the recoupment claim as an independent 
cause of action.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 86. Id. at 417. 
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Second, the Court noted that TILA expressly allows for recoupment 
of damages after the statute of limitations period has expired,87 yet 
is silent for the right of rescission.88 Third, the Court stated that, 
after TILA was amended, Congress ensured “any such liberality 
was ‘subject to the [three-year] time period provided in subsection 
(f).’”89 Therefore, Congress deliberately intended to treat damages 
and the right of rescission differently under TILA.90 Fourth, the 
Court recognized this distinction “makes perfectly good sense” 
because “a statutory right of rescission could cloud a bank’s title 
on foreclosure.”91 Respecting Congress’s intent,92 the Court 
rejected the Beaches’ argument and held that the right of 
rescission “completely extinguishes” after three years.93 
III. The Circuit Split & the Two Approaches 
In the aftermath of Beach, circuits have disagreed over how a 
consumer exercises TILA’s right of rescission.94 As a result, two 
approaches have emerged.95 This Part discusses the emergence 
                                                                                                     
 87. See id. at 418 (“[T]he effect of the 1-year limitation provision on 
damages actions is expressly deflected from recoupment claims.”). 
 88. See id. (“[H]owever, there [is] no provision for rescission as a defense 
that would mitigate the uncompromising provision of § 1635(f) that the 
borrower’s right ‘shall expire’ with the running of the time.”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. (“Thus, recoupment of damages and rescission in the nature of 
recoupment receive unmistakably different treatments, which under the normal 
rule of construction are understood to reflect a deliberate intent on the part of 
Congress.”). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at 419 (“We respect Congress’s manifest intent by concluding 
that the Act permits no federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after 
the 3-yeard period of § 1635(f) has run.”). 
 93. See id. at 412 (“We . . . hold that § 1635(f) completely extinguishes the 
right of rescission at the end of the 3-year period.”). 
 94. See Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(“Beach . . . does not address how an obligor must exercise his right of rescission 
within the three-year period.”); Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 
271, 278 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The Beach Court did not address the proper method of 
exercising a right to rescind or the timely exercise of that right.”). 
 95. See Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 726–27 (8th Cir. 2013)  
[T]he Fourth Circuit came to the conclusion that giving the creditor 
written notice, in any form, was enough to satisfy the statute of 
repose. . . . On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit . . . could not accept 
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and development of the circuit split.96 This Part then provides a 
representative case for each of the two approaches.97 Finally, this 
Part identifies the importance of the circuit split and discusses 
why it should be resolved quickly.98 
A. The Circuit Split 
After the Supreme Court decided Beach, the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit considered the issue of how a borrower 
exercises TILA’s right of rescission.99 The Ninth Circuit 
determined that a borrower must provide notice and file suit 
against the lender within three years of loan consummation to 
properly exercise rescission.100 Shortly thereafter, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the same issue.101 
Disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit,102 the Fourth Circuit decided 
that a borrower does not have to file suit.103 Instead, the borrower 
only has to provide the lender with written notice within three 
years of loan consummation to properly exercise rescission.104 
                                                                                                     
the view that notice without suit was enough, and instead, held that 
commencement of suit was required. 
 96. See infra notes 99–112 and accompanying text (discussing generally the 
circuit split). 
 97. See infra notes 114–33 and accompanying text (discussing each 
approach). 
 98. See infra notes 134–39 and accompanying text (discussing the 
significance of the circuit split). 
 99. See McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1326 
(9th Cir. 2012) (“McOmie-Gray argues that because she gave the Bank timely 
notice of rescission, she was not required to bring suit within the three-year 
period . . . . [T]he question presented is a matter of first impression.”). 
 100. See id. (stating that TILA “requir[es] dismissal of a claim for rescission 
brought more than three years after the consummation of the loan . . . 
regardless of when the borrower sends notice of rescission”). 
 101. See Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 275 (4th Cir. 
2012) (“The Gilberts first argue that the district court erred in dismissing their 
TILA claim on the basis that they had failed to exercise their extended right to 
rescind in a timely manner.”). 
 102. See id. at 276 (“[W]e disagree with the Ninth Circuit that a borrower 
must file a lawsuit within the three-year time period to exercise her right to 
rescind . . . .”). 
 103. See id. at 278 (stating that TILA’s right of rescission “does not require 
borrowers to file a claim”). 
 104. See id. at 277 (“[T]he Gilberts exercised their right to rescind with the 
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Because the Ninth and Fourth Circuits reached different 
conclusions concerning TILA’s rescission, a circuit split 
emerged.105 
B. The Two Approaches 
Other courts of appeals have further deepened the circuit 
split. The Tenth106 and Eighth107 Circuits have joined the Ninth 
Circuit by also requiring borrowers to provide notice and file suit 
against the lender within three years of loan consummation to 
properly exercise rescission108—the “Notice-and-Filing 
Approach.”109 However, the Third Circuit sided with the Fourth 
Circuit,110 deciding that mere notice to the lender is sufficient for 
a borrower to exercise rescission111—the “Notice-Only 
                                                                                                     
April 5, 2009, letter. Simply stated, neither 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) nor Regulation Z 
says anything about the filing of a lawsuit, and we refuse to graft such a 
requirement upon them.”). 
 105. See id. at 276 
There is a split of authority as to whether the borrower must file a 
lawsuit within three years after the consummation of a loan 
transaction to exercise her right to rescind, or whether the borrower 
need only assert the right to rescind through a written notice within 
the three-year period. 
 106. See Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1187 (10th Cir. 
2012) (stating that “we are not alone in our holding” and citing the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision). 
 107. See Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(“[W]e agree with the Tenth Circuit’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion in 
Rosenfield . . . .”). 
 108. See id. (holding that a borrower “must file suit, as opposed to merely 
giving the bank notice, within three years”); Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1182 
(deciding “a written letter, without more, is not enough”). 
 109. I created the phrase “Notice-and-Filing Approach” because it 
coordinates with the other approach, which the Third Circuit referred to as the 
“notice-only” approach. Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 265 
(3d Cir. 2013). See also infra note 112 and accompanying text (using the Notice-
Only Approach). 
 110. See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 261 (“We thus join the Fourth Circuit . . . .”). 
 111. See id. (holding that a borrower “exercises his right of rescission by 
sending the creditor valid written notice of rescission, and need not also file suit 
within the three-year period”). 
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Approach.”112 The remaining courts of appeals have yet to 
address the issue.113 
1. The Notice-and-Filing Approach 
Circuits adopting the Notice-and-Filing Approach require 
borrowers to provide written notice and file suit within three 
years of the loan’s consummation date to exercise TILA’s right of 
rescission.114 For example, in McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America 
Home Loans,115 the borrower refinanced a loan through a 
lender.116 At the closing, the lender provided the borrower with 
disclosures.117 Less than two years after receiving the loan, the 
borrower alleged that the disclosures violated TILA and sent the 
lender written notice to rescind the loan.118 The lender refused to 
rescind, claiming the borrower received the required disclosures 
under TILA.119 Three years and four months after receiving the 
loan, the borrower filed suit in federal district court for a 
declaration of rescission.120 
The district court dismissed the borrower’s complaint as 
untimely because it was brought after the three-year period.121 
                                                                                                     
 112. I adopted the phrase “Notice-Only Approach” from the Third Circuit. 
See id. at 265 (coining the term “notice-only” to describe its approach). 
 113. See supra notes 99, 101, 106–07, 110 and accompanying text 
(identifying the only five circuit cases that have decided how a borrower 
exercises TILA’s right of rescission). 
 114. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (describing the Notice-and-
Filing Approach). 
 115. 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 116. Id. at 1326. The borrower refinanced the mortgage loan with the lender. 
Complaint at 4, McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, No. 2:09-cv-02422, 
2010 WL 2546090 (E.D. Cal. June 23, 2010). Because nonpurchase mortgages 
include home refinancing, the borrower had a right of rescission under TILA. 
See supra note 54 and accompanying text (stating a nonpurchase mortgage, 
such as home refinancing, gives the borrower a right of rescission). 
 117. McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326. 
 118. See id. (“On January 18, 2008, McOmie-Gray, through her attorney, 
sent the bank notice of her intent to rescind the loan, citing the Bank’s failure to 
advise McOmie-Gray of the final date to cancel the transaction.”). 
 119. See id. at 1327 (“The Bank refused rescission, asserting that McOmie-
Gray had received proper notice of her right to rescind.”). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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On appeal, the borrower argued that she was not required to 
bring suit because she provided the lender with a timely notice of 
rescission.122 The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court 
properly dismissed the case as untimely because the borrower 
filed the rescission suit more than three years after the loan’s 
consummation date.123 
2. The Notice-Only Approach 
Circuits adopting the Notice-Only Approach require 
borrowers to provide lenders with a written notice within three 
years of the loan’s consummation date to exercise TILA’s right of 
rescission.124 For example, in Sherzer v. Homestar Mortgage 
Services,125 the borrowers acquired two refinanced loans on their 
home.126 Less than three years after closing, the borrowers sent 
written notice to the lenders, rescinding the loans because the 
lenders allegedly failed to make certain TILA disclosures.127 The 
lenders agreed to rescind the smaller loan but refused to rescind 
the larger loan, claiming there were no material TILA disclosure 
violations.128 Three years and three months after the loan closing, 
                                                                                                     
 122. See id. at 1326 (“McOmie-Gray argues that because she gave the Bank 
timely notice of rescission, she was not required to bring suit within the three-
year period, and the district court erred in dismissing this case.”). 
 123. See id. at 1329 (“Because § 1635(f) is a statute of repose, it extinguished 
McOmie-Gray’s right to rescission on April 14, 2009, three years after the 
consummation of the loan. McOmie-Gray did not file her rescission suit until 
August 28, 2009. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed this case as 
untimely . . . .”). 
 124. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (describing the Notice-Only 
Approach). 
 125. 707 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 126. Id. at 256. The borrowers refinanced their mortgage loans with the 
lender. Brief for Appellants at 9, Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 
255 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-4254). Because nonpurchase mortgages include home 
refinancing, the borrowers had a right of rescission under TILA. See supra note 
54 and accompanying text (stating that a nonpurchase mortgage, such as home 
refinancing, gives the borrower a right of rescission). 
 127. Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 256. 
 128. See id. (“As for the much larger loan, however, HSBC denied that 
rescission was appropriate, claiming that Homestar had not materially violated 
TILA.”). 
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the borrowers filed suit in federal district court for a declaration 
of rescission, among other remedies.129 
The district court granted the lenders’ motion for judgment 
on the pleadings, deciding that the borrowers’ rescission suit was 
time-barred because they filed it more than three years after the 
loan’s closing date.130 On appeal, the borrowers argued that 
sending the lenders a written notice within the three-year period 
represents a valid exercise of their TILA rescission rights.131 The 
Third Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment,132 holding 
that a borrower exercises her right of rescission by sending the 
lender a “valid written notice of rescission, and need not also file 
suit within the three-year period.”133 
C. Importance of Resolving the Circuit Split 
According to the Supreme Court’s Rules, the Court will 
consider granting a writ of certiorari when the courts of appeals 
decide cases in a conflicting manner, thus resulting in a circuit 
split.134 Furthermore, the Court typically will wait until at least 
three circuits have decided the issue.135 The issue of how a 
                                                                                                     
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. 
The Lenders filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing 
that suits for rescission filed more than three years after a loan’s 
closing date are time-barred under 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f), even when the 
obligor mailed a notice of rescission within the three-year period. . . . 
The District Court agreed with the Lenders, granted the motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, and dismissed the case. 
 131. See id. at 257 (stating that the Sherzers argue that “an obligor who has 
not received material disclosures can exercise his right to rescission and rescind 
his loan agreement simply by sending written notice to the lender within the 
three-year period”). 
 132. Id. at 267. 
 133. Id. at 261. 
 134. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (listing a circuit split as a “compelling reason” for the 
Supreme Court to consider granting a writ of certiorari). 
 135. See Nicholas J. Wagoner, D.C. Circuit Creates Circuit Split Over 
Graphic Cigarette Warning Labels, CIRCUIT SPLITS (Aug. 27, 2012, 05:38 AM), 
http://www.circuitsplits.com/2012/08/dc-circuit-creates-circuit-split-over-graphic-
cigarrette-warning-labels.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (“As a rule of thumb, 
the Supreme Court will typically let an issue on which the circuits are split 
‘percolate’ until at least three circuit courts have squarely addressed the issue.”) 
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borrower exercises TILA’s right of rescission within the statute’s 
three-year period satisfies these requirements: five circuits are 
split between two competing approaches.136  
As a general matter, TILA tends to be “over-litigated” as 
issues frequently arise concerning TILA’s impact on the lending 
market.137 Cases involving TILA’s rescission rights are not 
immune from this trend, as they are also frequently litigated.138 
Finally, major players in the lending market have recognized the 
need for a “correct and consistent” interpretation of TILA’s 
rescission,139 indicating the importance of resolving this issue 
quickly to promote uniformity.  
IV. Analyzing the Two Approaches 
Courts of appeals, scholars, and major players in the lending 
markets have endorsed both the Notice-Only and the Notice-and-
Filing Approach. This Part investigates the arguments and 
counterarguments of each approach, as stated by their respective 
supporters.140 Then, this Part argues that the Notice-and-Filing 
Approach is the better option and encourages courts to adopt it.141 
                                                                                                     
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 136. See supra Part III.B (identifying and categorizing the five circuit court 
decisions). 
 137. See Smith & Stevens, supra note 30, at 306 (“In this case the result is a 
TILA that is over-litigated, with more issues to come as Congress continues to 
expand into the substantive regulation of contract terms. The TILA has been a 
boon to consumer financial services lawyers on both sides of the issues . . . .”). 
 138. See Brief for Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at *2, Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 
1172 (10th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-1442) [hereinafter CFPB Brief] (“This case 
presents a frequently litigated question regarding the interpretation of TILA 
and its implementing regulation, Regulation Z, as they apply to the rescission of 
certain mortgage loans.” (emphasis added)). 
 139. See id. at *3 (stating that the CFPB has “a substantial interest in 
ensuring the correct and consistent interpretation of TILA and Regulation Z” in 
regards to rescission). 
 140. See infra notes 146–279 and accompanying text (discussing the 
arguments and counterarguments of both approaches). 
 141. See infra notes 280–303 and accompanying text (recommending the 
Notice-and-Filing Approach). 
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A. The Notice-Only Approach: Arguments & Counterarguments 
Supporters of the Notice-Only Approach justify its adoption 
using a series of arguments. First, the circuit courts make 
textual, structural, and precedential arguments.142 Second, 
supporters argue that agency deference and statutory purpose 
support the Notice-Only Approach.143 Third, supporters make 
pragmatic arguments to justify their approach.144 This section 
explores and challenges these arguments below. 
1. The Text of TILA & Regulation Z 
The Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fourth Circuits have 
justified their adoption of the Notice-Only Approach by using 
textual arguments. These circuits have pointed out that courts 
always start with the text in a statutory-interpretation 
analysis.145 Accordingly, these circuits determined that neither 
the plain meaning of TILA nor Regulation Z requires the filing of 
a suit.146 Indeed, both texts “refer exclusively” to written notice as 
the means to exercise a right of rescission.147 Therefore, the 
absence of references to filing suit indicates rescission can be 
exercised without a court filing.148 Finally, the legislative history 
shows that Congress intended for the borrower to exercise her 
right of rescission “without judicial intervention.”149 Accordingly, 
                                                                                                     
 142. Infra Part IV.A.1–3. 
 143. Infra Part IV.A.4–5. 
 144. Infra Part IV.A.6–8. 
 145. See Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(stating “we begin with the statutory text”); Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 
678 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 2012) (same).  
 146. See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 267 (“According to the most natural reading of 
the statutory language, an obligor must send valid written notice of rescission 
before the three years expire. . . . [T]he statute says nothing about filing a suit 
within that three-year period . . . .”); Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 277 (“[N]either 15 
U.S.C. § 1635(f) nor Regulation Z says anything about the filing of a lawsuit, 
and we refuse to graft such a requirement upon them.”). 
 147. Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 258. 
 148. See id. at 260 (“Thus, the absence of any reference to causes of action or 
the commencement of suits in § 1635 also suggests that rescission may be 
accomplished without a formal court filing.”). 
 149. Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 734 (8th Cir. 2013) 
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the text only requires a borrower to provide written notice to 
exercise her right of rescission, consistent with the Notice-Only 
Approach. 
2. The Structure of TILA 
The Third and Fourth Circuits have also used structural 
arguments to support the Notice-Only Approach. First, these 
circuits point out that other sections of TILA suggest that the 
right of rescission “occurs automatically.”150 For example, one 
section requires lenders to return money or property to borrowers 
within a set number of days after receipt of written notice rather 
than after a court order.151 Second, the courts reason that, 
because the borrower does not have to file suit within three days 
of loan consummation to exercise the three-day right of 
rescission, she should not have to file suit within three years of 
loan consummation to exercise the three-year right of 
rescission.152 Third, when TILA does mention the judiciary’s 
involvement, the statute does not say whether that involvement 
is necessary for rescission.153 Overall, the Notice-Only Approach 
remains consistent with the structure of TILA. 
                                                                                                     
(Murphy, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 150. Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 258–59. 
 151. See id. at 259 (“[Section] 1635(b) states that the creditor must return 
money or property ‘[w]ithin 20 days after receipt of a notice of rescission’—not 
within twenty days of a court order stating that the obligor is entitled to 
rescind.”). 
 152. See id. at 264 
If an obligor . . . exercise[s] his three-day right to rescission . . . . [t]he 
obligor is not required to file suit against the creditor during the 
three-day period . . . . After the three-day period has expired, the 
obligor no longer has a “right of rescission”—but because he exercised 
that right in a timely manner, he now has a statutory right to his 
property and to clear title. The three-year right of rescission should 
be understood to work in the same way: it expires if it is not exercised 
in three years, but borrowers who have exercised the right can file 
suit after the three-year period has passed. (citation omitted) 
(footnote omitted). 
 153. See id. at 260 (“Only two provisions in § 1635 make any mention of 
courts, and both are silent as to whether court involvement is necessary to effect 
rescission.”). 
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One response to these structural arguments involves 
distinguishing TILA’s three-day right of rescission from its three-
year right of rescission. As previously stated, supporters argue 
that because a borrower does not have to file suit to exercise the 
three-day rescission, she should not have to do so to exercise the 
three-year rescission.154 However, a borrower exercising three-
day rescission cannot file suit due to a justiciability problem: the 
borrower lacks standing because TILA gives the lender twenty 
days to terminate his security interest in the borrower’s principal 
residence.155 Stated differently, a borrower’s three-day rescission 
will expire before the lender’s twenty-day period to terminate his 
security interest, thereby preventing a borrower from filing suit 
for lack of standing. This justiciability problem disappears for 
three-year rescission, conceivably, because a borrower can have 
standing to file suit after the lender’s twenty-day period expires 
yet before the borrower’s three-year rescission also expires. 
Therefore, opponents of the Notice-Only Approach can argue that 
justiciability concerns permit treating TILA’s three-day rescission 
and three-year rescission differently without offending the 
statute’s structure. 
3. The Supreme Court’s Beach Decision 
Circuits have used precedential arguments to support the 
Notice-Only Approach. Many of these courts determined that 
Beach is not controlling because the Supreme Court never 
addressed how a borrower must exercise her right of rescission.156 
                                                                                                     
 154. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (comparing TILA’s three-day 
and three-year right of rescission). 
 155. See Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 733 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(Murphy, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that TILA does not require a 
borrower to file suit to exercise the three-day right of rescission “for good 
reason” because “[d]uring those three days the obligor would still likely lack the 
grounds for filing because § 1635(b) gives the lender twenty days to terminate 
his security interest”). 
 156. See Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 262 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(“Critical to this appeal, nowhere in Beach does the Court address how an 
obligor must exercise his right of rescission within that three-year period.”); 
Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 278 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The 
Beach Court did not address the proper method of exercising a right to rescind 
or the timely exercise of that right.”). 
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Accordingly, the courts characterized Beach’s language 
concerning TILA’s right of rescission as dicta.157 Even as dicta, 
however, the courts claim that Beach remains consistent with the 
Notice-Only Approach because Beach merely requires that the 
borrower exercise the right of rescission within three years.158 
4. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Endorsement 
In addition to the Third and Fourth Circuits, the CFPB 
endorses the Notice-Only Approach159 as a “private, non-judicial 
mechanism” to exercise TILA’s right of rescission.160 The CFPB is 
now “the primary source for interpretation and application of 
truth-in-lending law.”161 Accordingly, courts grant deference to 
the CFPB’s interpretations of TILA and Regulation Z.162 
Therefore, the CFPB’s support of the Notice-Only Approach 
carries significant weight.163 
                                                                                                     
 157. See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 263 (“In resolving the question at issue here, 
we rely on the statutory language, not on the debatable implications of dicta.”). 
 158. See id.  
[Beach] is also consistent with our view that they need only send 
notice of rescission to the lenders during that period, if that is how 
the right of rescission is exercised. The most that can be 
gleaned . . . is that, however the right of rescission is to be exercised, 
it must be done within three years. 
 159. See CFPB Brief, supra note 138, at *14 (“Under the plain terms of 
§ 1635—and the Bureau’s controlling interpretation of that provision—
consumers exercise their rescission right by providing notice to their lender 
within three years of obtaining the loan.” (emphasis added)). 
 160. Id. at *25. 
 161. Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 238 (2004) 
(citation omitted). Although the Supreme Court made this statement in regards 
to the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors, Congress transferred the Board’s 
power to the CFPB in 2010, thereby allowing the Court’s quote to apply to the 
CFPB as well. See 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b)(1)(B) (2012) (transferring the Board’s 
“powers and duties” that “relat[ed] to consumer financial protection functions” 
to the CFPB). 
 162. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980) 
(“[D]eference is especially appropriate in the process of interpreting the Truth in 
Lending Act and Regulation Z. Unless demonstrably irrational . . . [the CFPB’s] 
staff opinions construing the Act or Regulation should be dispositive . . . .”). 
 163. See, e.g., Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 731 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(Murphy, J., concurring and dissenting) (“The majority decision is contrary 
to . . . the position of the agency responsible for enforcing it.”); Rosenfield v. 
HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1178 n.4 (10th Cir. 2012) (acknowledging 
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Although the CFPB endorses the Notice-Only Approach, 
some circuits have refused to be persuaded by the CFPB’s amici 
briefs. For example, because the Eighth Circuit determined that 
the text of TILA and the Beach decision plainly require a 
borrower to file suit, it refused to give deference to the CFPB’s 
interpretations.164 The Tenth Circuit has made a similar 
determination.165 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit, in a different TILA context, has refused to give Chevron 
deference166 to Regulation Z’s interpretation of TILA because it 
conflicted with TILA’s text.167 In sum, the Eighth and Tenth 
Circuits’ actions, coupled with another circuit’s refusal to grant 
Chevron deference, indicate that TILA’s text and the Beach 
decision justify rejecting the Notice-Only Approach, even when 
endorsed by the CFPB. 
5. TILA as a Remedial Statute 
 Most courts agree that TILA exists as a remedial statute 
that must be construed to favor borrowers.168 Prior to TILA, 
                                                                                                     
receipt of an amicus curiae from the CFPB and finding it “helpful”); CFPB Brief, 
supra note 138, at *12 (“Even if § 1635 were silent or ambiguous on this issue, 
‘absent some obvious repugnance to the statute, the * * * regulation 
implementing [TILA] should be accepted by the courts[.]’” (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted)). 
 164. See Keiran, 720 F.3d at 728 (stating “we are not unmindful of” CFPB’s 
regulations but “the text of the statute, as explicated in Beach, establishes that 
filing suit is required”). 
 165. See Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1186 n.10 (stating that the CFPB’s 
“arguments have some superficial appeal, but we are constrained by the Beach 
Court’s defining of the parameters of rescission under TILA”). 
 166. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842–43 (1984) (“When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the 
statute which it administers . . . . [i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the 
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” (footnote omitted)). 
 167. See Conference Honors Chairman Emeritus Lawrence X. Pusateri, 55 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 290, 294 (2001) 
The Sixth Circuit reversed, refusing to give Chevron deference to the 
Federal Reserve Board interpretation of the Truth in Lending Act in 
Regulation Z. The Sixth Circuit found that: “Regulation Z’s exclusion 
of over-limit fees, such as those imposed in this case, from the ‘finance 
charge’ conflicts with the express language [of] TILA.” 
 168. See, e.g., Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1179–80 (“In light of its remedial 
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“unsophisticated” borrowers had little leverage in loan 
negotiations with lenders.169 To address this problem, Congress 
designed TILA to shift bargaining power from lenders to 
borrowers via the right of rescission.170 Therefore, supporters of 
the Notice-Only Approach argue that requiring unsophisticated 
borrowers to file suit in addition to sending notice to the lender 
violates TILA’s purpose as a remedial statute favoring 
borrowers.171 
Those opposing the Notice-Only Approach recognize TILA’s 
remedial nature, but argue that this approach disproportionately 
favors borrowers.172 Many borrowers make rescission claims just 
before bankruptcy or during foreclosure in an attempt to prevent 
enforcement of their obligations.173 Opponents argue that the 
Notice-Only Approach allows a borrower merely to provide 
written notice to rescind the loan even if the lender complied with 
                                                                                                     
nature, we liberally construe TILA’s language in favor of the consumer.”); Bragg 
v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc., 374 F.3d 1060, 1065 (11th Cir. 2004) (same); 
Begala v. PNC Bank, Ohio, Nat’l Ass’n, 163 F.3d 948, 950 (6th Cir. 1998) (same); 
Smith v. Fid. Consumer Disc. Co., 898 F.2d 896, 898 (3d Cir. 1990) (same). 
 169. See Shepard, supra note 35, at 192 (“TILA is designed to protect 
borrowers who, relative to lenders, are unsophisticated actors who possess less 
leverage in loan negotiations.” (footnote omitted)). 
 170. See id. (stating that Congress shifted “significant leverage from lenders 
to borrowers in setting forth a strict liability remedy that substantially 
liberalizes the steps needed to unwind a mortgage transaction under the 
common law”). 
 171. See Danielle Godfrey, Note, Giving David Back His Stone: How Gilbert 
v. Residential Funding Revitalizes the Truth in Lending Rescission Right and 
Enhances Consumer Protection Under the Truth in Lending Act, 48 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 547, 564 (2013) (“Requiring these already overwhelmed 
borrowers to file suit cannot be reconciled with the statute’s consumer-
protection purpose nor with the idea that TILA is a remedial statute . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 172. See Brief for Amici Curiae American Bankers Ass’n, Consumer Bankers 
Ass’n, and Consumer Mortg. Coalition Supporting Appellees at *10, Wolf v. Fed. 
Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 512 F. App’x 336 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-2419) [hereinafter 
ABA Brief] (“Congress could not have intended an equitable remedy to create 
substantial inequities, but that is what Gilbert threatens to do. . . . ‘[I]t was not 
the intent of Congress to reduce the mortgage company to an unsecured creditor 
or to simply permit the debtor to indefinitely extend the loan without interest.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
 173. See id. at *8 (“TILA rescission claims frequently lack merit. Borrowers 
often raise such claims on the eve of bankruptcy or in the midst of a foreclosure 
proceeding in a last ditch effort to avoid enforcement of their obligations.”). 
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TILA’s requirements.174 This unilateral power to rescind without 
cause could unfairly result in the cancellation of a TILA-
compliant lender’s security interest in the collateral.175 Moreover, 
the Notice-Only Approach’s disproportionate favoritism does not 
stop at the borrowers facing bankruptcy or foreclosure 
proceedings. Opponents argue that all borrowers can “pre-file” 
their notice of rescission with lenders.176 In other words, as long 
as a borrower sends the lender a notice of rescission before the 
three-year period, then the borrower can wait indefinitely to use 
it.177 By disproportionately favoring borrowers, the Notice-Only 
Approach detrimentally impacts lenders and extends TILA’s 
remedial nature too far. 
As a practical matter, supporters of the Notice-Only 
Approach argue that the Notice-and-Filing Approach offends 
TILA’s remedial nature due to its expensive filing requirement. 
The Notice-Only Approach merely requires a borrower to send 
written notice, a cheap endeavor that most likely will involve only 
the cost of paper and postage.178 In comparison, the Notice-and-
Filing Approach requires a borrower to file a lawsuit, an act 
involving expensive court and attorneys’ fees.179 These litigation 
expenses, Notice-Only supporters argue, offend TILA’s remedial 
nature that favors borrowers, especially those borrowers facing 
financial problems.180 
Three counterarguments undermine the notion that the 
litigation expenses associated with Notice-and-Filing Approach 
                                                                                                     
 174. See Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 264 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(stating a borrower could transmit “notice of rescission when he has no cause to 
do so”). 
 175. See id. (noting this argument). 
 176. See ABA Brief, supra note 172, at *9 (“Allowing a rescission action to 
proceed at any juncture without limitation, so long as a notice was filed within 
three years, creates a perverse incentive for borrowers to ‘pre-file’ a notice of 
rescission before the three-year period expires.”). 
 177. See id. (“The borrower can now hold that right of rescission indefinitely, 
until it becomes useful.”). 
 178. See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 267 (stating that “it costs little for an obligor to 
send a letter to the lender” under the Notice-Only Approach). 
 179. Id. (stating that, under the Notice-and-Filing Approach, “the lender 
would incur some cost to sue to determine title”). 
 180. See Godrey, supra note 171, at 565 (stating that the Notice-and-Filing 
Approach will “[d]iscourag[e] communication between borrowers and lenders” 
and can lead to “costly litigation”). 
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upset TILA’s remedial nature. First, parties rarely resolve 
rescission disputes without court involvement.181 Accordingly, a 
borrower will likely face litigation expenses under either 
approach. Second, the borrower does not have to pursue the 
lawsuit to completion: lenders have an incentive to settle strong 
rescission claims to also avoid litigation costs.182 During these 
settlements, borrowers can negotiate to reduce the loan 
amount,183 a step that may actually offset any initial legal fees to 
file suit. Third, a borrower with financial problems can seek 
assistance with legal fees. For example, the borrower can request 
that a federal court waive any filing fees based on demonstrated 
financial need.184 Overall, under the Notice-and-Filing Approach, 
a borrower’s litigation expenses can be mitigated or eliminated in 
the settlement context or by a request for a court waiver. 
6. State Statutes of Limitations Apply 
Supporting the Notice-Only Approach, the Third Circuit 
stated that the borrower cannot wait indefinitely to file suit after 
sending the lender a written notice because of state statutes of 
limitations.185 As a general practice, if a federal law creates a 
cause of action but does not provide a statute of limitations, then 
courts will borrow an analogous state statute of limitations.186 
                                                                                                     
 181. See Shepard, supra note 35, at 193 (stating that courts “frequently are 
forced” to determine whether a TILA violation occurred). 
 182. See id. at 180 (stating that, after the borrower files a rescission suit, 
“lenders have been known to settle with borrowers who bring strong rescission 
claims”). 
 183. See id. (speculating that “lenders might agree to modify a borrower’s 
mortgage loan by reducing the current balance by roughly the same amount the 
lender would have to return to the borrower in a rescission” and estimating that 
amount to be “ten to twenty percent” of the original loan). 
 184. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (2012) (permitting a federal court to waive 
filing fees for civil and criminal actions where the party submits an affidavit 
disclosing all assets and stating that she “is unable to pay such fees or give 
security therefor”). 
 185. See Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 265 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(“An obligor who has sent a written notice of rescission to his lender but received 
no response will not be able to wait indefinitely before filing a lawsuit to enforce 
the rescission . . . because statutes of limitation will constrain his ability to file 
suit.”). 
 186. See Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. 
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Therefore, because TILA does not provide a statute of limitations 
for rescission claims, a state statute of limitations will prevent a 
borrower from waiting indefinitely to file suit after providing 
written notice.187  
Conceivably, a state statute of limitations will curtail a 
borrower’s ability to wait indefinitely.188 However, this argument 
remains incompatible with the reason Congress passed TILA in 
the first place: to bring uniformity to the lending market that was 
previously governed by a patchwork of state laws.189 The Third 
Circuit’s proposal to apply different states’ varied statutes of 
limitations will return the lending market to disorder as lenders 
and borrowers struggle to apply various state statutes of 
limitations with different time lengths to TILA’s right of 
rescission. 
7. Conservation of Judicial Resources 
Comparing the two approaches, supporters argue that the 
Notice-Only Approach saves judicial resources.190 Specifically, the 
Notice-and-Filing Approach encourages borrowers to involve 
courts immediately instead of trying first to enter into private 
negotiations with the lender, thereby avoiding courts 
altogether.191 Accordingly, the Notice-Only Approach conserves 
                                                                                                     
Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 414 (2005) (stating that when a federal statute lacks an 
expressed limitations period, courts “generally ‘borrow’ the most closely 
analogous state limitations period”). 
 187. See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 266 (“Thus, if the obligor mails a notice of 
rescission but takes no action for ten years, the lender can at least be assured 
that the obligor will not be able to file a timely court action.”). 
 188. See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text (describing the effect of 
state statutes of limitations on TILA rescission suits filed by borrowers). 
 189. See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text (describing the pre-TILA 
lending market’s lack of uniformity). 
 190. See CFPB Brief, supra note 138, at *10 (“Requiring consumers to file 
suit within the three-year timeframe . . . wastes valuable judicial 
resources . . . .”). 
 191. See id. at *18–19 (“Requiring consumers not only to notify their lender 
but also to file a lawsuit within three years would incentivize consumers to file 
suit immediately, rather than working privately with the lender to unwind the 
transaction.”). 
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judicial resources by giving borrowers the option to enter into 
private negotiations with the lenders. 
Critics respond by arguing that, in practice, the Notice-Only 
Approach will not conserve judicial resources. Specifically, the 
Notice-Only Approach will increase litigation among all 
participants in the lending markets as sellers struggle to clear 
title and lenders respond to “pre-filing” attempts by borrowers.192 
In addition to its failure to conserve judicial resources, the 
Notice-Only Approach will also increase costs for borrowers as 
lenders pass these costs on to future borrowers.193 
8. Exercising Rescission Versus Confirming Rescission 
Notice-Only Approach supporters distinguish between a 
borrower exercising the right of rescission and confirming the 
rescission’s validity.194 A borrower exercises rescission by written 
notice.195 A borrower then confirms the rescission in one of two 
ways: (1) an agreement from the lender that the rescission is 
valid; or (2) a decree from the court that the rescission is valid.196 
                                                                                                     
 192. See Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1185 (10th Cir. 
2012) (“[E]nforcement would likely be costly and difficult.”); ABA Brief, supra 
note 172, at *15 (“Litigation will increase not just between lenders and 
borrowers, but also between (a) lenders themselves; (b) secondary market 
participants and lenders; and (c) home buyers and home sellers.”); cf. Sherzer v. 
Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 267 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[P]ermitting obligors 
to rescind by written notice could potentially impose additional costs on banks, 
as it costs little for an obligor to send a letter to the lender while, on the other 
hand, the lender would incur some cost to sue to determine title.”). 
 193. See ABA Brief, supra note 172, at *14 (stating that the Notice-Only 
Approach “will increase the costs to lenders and their assignees on every loan in 
other ways; these costs will be borne by borrowers at the closing table”); cf. 
Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 267 (“This may, in turn, be more costly for borrowers 
insofar as lenders—like all businesses—pass along costs occasioned by 
regulation or taxation to their customers.”). 
 194. See Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 277 (4th Cir. 
2012) (“We must not conflate the issue of whether a borrower has exercised her 
right to rescind with the issue of whether the rescission has, in fact, been 
completed and the contract voided.”). 
 195. See id. (“The former is the concern of § 1635(f) and Regulation Z, and a 
borrower exercises her right of rescission by merely communicating in writing to 
her creditor her intention to rescind.”). 
 196. See id. (“To complete the rescission and void the contract . . . the 
creditor must ‘acknowledge[] that the right of rescission is available’ and the 
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Accordingly, borrowers can exercise and confirm rescission 
privately with the lender or request the judiciary to confirm the 
rescission.197 
For the sake of argument, assume a borrower has exercised 
rescission by providing the lender with notice. Three possible 
scenarios can then occur. First, the borrower and lender, through 
private agreement, can confirm that a valid rescission occurred.198 
Second, if the lender refuses to confirm rescission, the borrower 
can sue, asking a court to confirm and enforce the rescission.199 
Third, if the lender believes the borrower improperly exercised 
rescission, the lender can sue, asking a court to enforce the loan 
agreement.200 
In practice, this complicated structure requires the 
“unsophisticated borrower”201 to determine if a lawsuit should be 
filed and who should be filing it. Furthermore, the vast majority 
of borrowers attempting to exercise rescission will find 
themselves in litigation as compared to a private agreement with 
                                                                                                     
parties must unwind the transaction amongst themselves, or the borrower must 
file a lawsuit so that the court may enforce the right to rescind.” (alteration in 
original)). 
 197. See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 257 
Under this view, rescission of the loan agreement occurs when a valid 
notice of rescission is sent, not when a court enters an order enforcing 
the obligor's rights. The subsequent legal action would simply 
determine whether a valid rescission had occurred, and, if so, the 
court would enforce the respective obligations of the parties.  
 198. See CFPB Brief, supra note 138, at *14 (stating that “[S]ection 1635 is 
written with the goal of making the rescission process a private one, worked out 
between creditor and debtor without the intervention of the courts”). 
 199. See Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 257 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(“If the lender does not comply with § 1635(b)—because, for example, it contends 
that all relevant disclosures have been made such that the obligor had no right 
to rescind the agreement—the obligor may file an action to recover the money 
and property owed and to quiet title.”). 
 200. See id. at 265 (“If the borrower fails to exercise a valid right to 
rescission, the lender maintains its security interest in the property and does 
not incur any obligations toward the borrower. A lender who believes an 
obligor’s notice of rescission is invalid may choose to file suit to resolve any 
uncertainty.”); CFPB Brief, supra note 138, at *18 (“When disputes arise, either 
the lender or the consumer may initiate litigation. . . . If the court finds the 
consumer was not entitled to rescind, the loan remains in place.”). 
 201. See Godfrey, supra note 171, at 552 (using the adjective 
“unsophisticated” to describe the type of borrower that TILA is designed to 
protect). 
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the lender.202 Accordingly, by requiring the borrower to file suit in 
every scenario,203 the Notice-and-Filing Approach simplifies 
rescission and maintains TILA’s purpose of protecting borrowers 
by avoiding the “uninformed use of credit.”204 
B. The Notice-and-Filing Approach: Arguments & 
Counterarguments 
Supporters of the Notice-and-Filing Approach justify its 
adoption using a series of arguments. First, the circuit courts 
make textual and precedential arguments.205 Second, supporters 
argue that TILA’s right of rescission functions as both a statute of 
repose and an equitable remedy.206 Third, supporters make 
pragmatic arguments to justify the Notice-and-Filing 
Approach.207 
1. The Text of TILA & Regulation Z 
The Courts of Appeals for the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits have used textual arguments to support the Notice-and-
Filing Approach. These circuits claim the texts of TILA and 
Regulation Z do not provide an exhaustive list of actions 
necessary to exercise rescission.208 Therefore, the textual 
requirement of written notice is necessary but not sufficient to 
                                                                                                     
 202. See Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(“[F]iling suit will certainly be necessary to actually accomplish rescission in 
most cases where rescission under TILA is sought.” (emphasis added)). 
 203. Cf. Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 258 (“The Lenders argue that when there is a 
dispute regarding the propriety of rescission, the obligor must file suit within 
three years of the closing date to exercise his right of rescission or he will be 
forever time-barred. This view has been adopted by the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits.”). 
 204. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012). 
 205. Infra Part IV.B.1–2. 
  206. Infra Part IV.A.3–4. 
 207. Infra Part IV.A.5–7. 
 208. See Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(“[W]hile Regulation Z sets forth one of the things an obligor must do to rescind 
the loan—give written notice to the bank—it does not set forth the entirety of 
things necessary to accomplish rescission.”). 
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exercise the right of rescission.209 Then what is the purpose of the 
written notice? The circuits reason that the written notice shows 
intent to rescind, and a lawsuit exercises the right of rescission.210 
Accordingly, a borrower must provide written notice and file suit 
before the three-year expiration date.211  
2. The Supreme Court’s Beach Decision 
Circuits have used Beach to justify adoption of the Notice-
and-Filing Approach. These courts consider Beach to be 
dispositive on the issue of how a borrower exercises TILA’s right 
of rescission.212 Specifically, the courts read Beach to classify 
TILA’s right of rescission as a statute of repose.213  
                                                                                                     
 209. See Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1185 (10th Cir. 
2012) (“We do not, however, read [TILA and Regulation Z] as establishing that 
notice is a sufficient condition for the exercise of the TILA rescission right. Read 
plainly, these provisions suggest only that the giving of notice is a necessary 
predicate act to the ultimate exercise of the right . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 210. See Keiran, 720 F.3d at 728 (“Our interpretation of § 1635(f) creates no 
dissonance between the regulation and the statute. The regulation requires 
notice to the lender of an intent to rescind, and the statute requires that 
rescission be accomplished within three years or the right expires.”); Rosenfield, 
681 F.3d at 1185 (“‘[B]y notifying the creditor . . . a borrower may properly alert 
the creditor of her intent to rescind the underlying transaction.”); McOmie-Gray 
v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he statute 
and regulations contemplate that a borrower, who by sending notice of 
rescission has ‘advanced a claim seeking rescission,’ will seek a determination 
that rescission is proper.” (citation omitted)). 
 211. See Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1186 (“[W]e cannot ignore the mandatory 
language of § 1635(f), which pertinently provides that the ‘obligor's right of 
rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the 
transaction or upon . . . sale of the property.’” (citation omitted)). 
 212. See McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1328 (“[U]nder the case law of this court 
and the Supreme Court, rescission suits must be brought within three years 
from the consummation of the loan . . . .”); Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1182 (“Beach 
is dispositive of the instant question . . . . [W]e must hold that the mere 
invocation of the right to rescission via a written letter, without more, is not 
enough to preserve a court’s ability to effectuate (or recognize) a rescission claim 
after the three-year period has run.”). 
 213. See Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1182 (“Ms. Rosenfield’s position is not 
consistent with the effect of a strict repose period—which Beach held that 
§ 1635(f) establishes in this context—one that operates to completely extinguish 
the right being claimed after it lapses.”); McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326 (“15 
U.S.C. § 1635(f) is a three-year statute of repose, requiring dismissal of a claim 
for rescission brought more than three years after the consummation of the 
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A statute of repose bars legal action after a set period of time 
triggered by an event.214 Furthermore, a statute of repose 
“terminates any right” to action or recovery after the expiration 
date by imposing an “absolute time limit.”215 Stated differently, a 
statute of repose prevents a party from bringing an action or 
raising a defense after the time period expires. In contrast, a 
statute of limitations is not absolute because it does not 
terminate the substantive right or the right to recover.216 Instead, 
a statute of limitations only “makes the remedy unavailable” to 
the party.217 In other words, a statute of limitations prevents a 
party from bringing an action but allows raising a defense after 
the time period expires.218 
Perhaps the best way to understand the difference between a 
statute of repose and a statute of limitations is through the Beach 
decision. The Beaches stopped making payments on their 
refinanced loan five years after the loan’s consummation.219 
Because five years exceeds the three-year time period for TILA’s 
rescission, the Beaches admitted they could not bring a rescission 
action against the lender.220 However, believing TILA’s rescission 
to act as a statute of limitations, the Beaches argued they could 
use rescission as an affirmative defense in the lender’s collection 
                                                                                                     
loan . . . .”). 
 214. See 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 24 (2013) (“A statute of 
repose is designed to bar actions after a specified period of time has run from 
the occurrence of some event other than the injury which gave rise to the claim.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 215. Id. (emphasis added). 
 216. See id. § 20 (“A statute of limitations . . . does not extinguish the 
substantive or underlying right, or affect the right to recover.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 217. See id. (“When the statute of limitations expires, it does not extinguish 
the cause of action, but instead, makes the remedy unavailable.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 218. See id. (“A statute of limitations does not take away rights, as such, but 
merely precludes the plaintiff from proceeding . . . although the plaintiff was not 
diligent enough, the right goes on, but the plaintiff simply cannot go to court in 
order to enforce it.” (footnote omitted)). 
 219. Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 413 (1998). 
 220. See id. at 415 (“The Beaches concede that any right they may have had 
to institute an independent proceeding for rescission under § 1635 lapsed in 
1989, three years after they closed the loan with the bank . . . .”). 
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action brought after the three-year period expired.221 The 
Supreme Court disagreed with the Beaches and determined that 
TILA’s rescission functions instead as a statute of repose.222 
Therefore, the Beaches could not bring a rescission action or raise 
a defense after TILA’s three-year period ended.223 By reading 
Beach as deciding that TILA’s rescission provision is a statute of 
repose, some circuits conclude that the borrower must file suit 
before the end of TILA rescission’s three-year expiration 
period.224  
3. TILA’s Right of Rescission is a Statute of Repose Requiring Suit 
Extending the precedential argument concerning Beach, 
supporters of the Notice-and-Filing Approach argue that TILA’s 
rescission provision, as a statute of repose, requires a borrower to 
file suit.225 
                                                                                                     
 221. See id. (“The Beaches . . . argue that the restriction to three years in 
§ 1635(f) is a statute of limitation governing only the institution of suit and 
accordingly has no effect when a borrower claims a § 1635 right of rescission as 
a ‘defense in recoupment’ to a collection action.”). 
 222. See id. at 417 
Section 1635(f), however, takes us beyond any question whether it 
limits more than the time for bringing a suit, by governing the life of 
the underlying right as well. The subsection says nothing in terms of 
bringing an action but instead provides that the “right of rescission 
[under the Act] shall expire” at the end of the time period. It talks not 
of a suit’s commencement but of a right’s duration, which it addresses 
in terms so straightforward as to render any limitation on the time 
for seeking a remedy superfluous.  
 223. See id. at 412 (“We . . . hold that § 1635(f) completely extinguishes the 
right of rescission at the end of the 3-year period.”). 
 224. See McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1329 
(9th Cir. 2012) (“Section 1635(f) is therefore not merely a statute of 
limitations—it completely extinguishes the underlying right itself.” (emphasis 
added)); Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1183 (10th Cir. 2012) 
Indeed, we believe that it is the filing of an action in a court (or 
perhaps a defensive assertion of the rescission right in a court) that is 
required to invoke the right limited by the TILA statute of repose; the 
concept of repose itself (especially in the context here) fundamentally 
limits the ability to file an action. 
 225. See McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326 (“[Section] 1635(f) is a three-year 
statute of repose, requiring dismissal of a claim for rescission brought more than 
three years after the consummation of the loan secured by the first trust deed, 
regardless of when the borrower sends notice of rescission.”). 
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In response, supporters of the Notice-Only Approach claim 
that, even if TILA’s rescission provision operates as a statute of 
repose, it does not require filing suit.226 Specifically, a statute of 
repose requires a person to act but does not necessarily require 
that action to be a lawsuit.227 For example, a New York law 
containing a statute of repose gives a bank customer one year to 
object to an unauthorized payment for a wire transfer after 
receiving notice of the transaction.228 In this example, a customer 
has one year to notify the bank of her objection to the transfer,229 
an action that does not require filing suit. Accordingly, Notice-
Only supporters argue that the relevant statute will dictate the 
action required before the statute of repose’s expiration.230 
In the context of TILA, supporters of the Notice-Only 
Approach argue that the statute only requires notice of 
rescission.231 To bolster the notice-only claim, supporters argue 
that Congress explicitly states when filing suit is required: 
Congress may choose to use a statute of repose to make the 
filing of a lawsuit necessary in order to exercise a statutory 
                                                                                                     
 226. See Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 732 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(Murphy, J., concurring and dissenting) (“It also cannot be inferred from the fact 
that § 1635 is a statute of repose that homeowners must sue to exercise their 
right of rescission.”); CFPB Brief, supra note 138, at *11 
Even though Beach is not directly on point, courts have interpreted 
that decision to hold that § 1635(f) is a “statute of repose.” That, they 
reason, by definition requires the filing of a lawsuit. But statutes of 
repose often are satisfied by acts other than initiating litigation. 
Thus, even assuming § 1635(f) is a “statute of repose,” it may be 
satisfied by providing notice to the lender.  
 227. See Keiran, 720 F.3d at 732 (Murphy, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(“Once a statute of repose has been triggered, a party faces a deadline within 
which it must act, but there is no requirement that the action be a lawsuit.”); 
CFPB Brief, supra note 138, at *19 (“While § 1635(f) has features of a statute of 
repose, there is no general rule that a statute of repose can be satisfied only by 
filing a lawsuit, and Beach should not be read to require that result.”). 
 228. N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 4-A-505 (McKinney 2012). 
 229. See id. (finding the statute of repose barred the customer’s claim 
because “he failed to notify Merrill Lynch of his objections within one year”). 
 230. See Keiran, 720 F.3d at 732 (Murphy, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(“The nature of the required action depends on what the statute provides.”). 
 231. See id. (“TILA unambiguously provides that the right of rescission is 
exercised ‘by notifying the creditor, in accordance with the regulations of the 
[Consumer Financial Protection] Bureau, of his intention to do so.’” (alteration 
in original) (citation omitted)). 
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right, but when it has chosen to do so, it has done it explicitly. 
Section 413 of ERISA provides an example of a statute of 
repose in connection with breaches of fiduciary duties: “No 
action may be commenced” more than six years after the 
alleged breach of fiduciary duty occurred.232 
Because Congress did not explicitly refer to a lawsuit in TILA’s 
rescission provision,233 and because the only action mentioned 
involves notice,234 a borrower’s notice to a lender satisfies the 
action required under TILA rescission as a statute of repose. 
Although the Notice-Only Approach may appear convincing, 
in practice it destroys the overall purpose of a statute of repose. A 
statute of repose prevents a party from bringing an action or 
raising a defense after a set time period expires, thereby 
imposing an absolute time limit.235 Applied to the TILA context, 
as clarified by the Supreme Court’s Beach decision, the three-year 
time limit on the borrower’s right of rescission functions as an 
absolute bar.236 Stated differently, a borrower’s rescission rights 
completely expire three years after loan consummation.237 Yet 
under the Notice-Only Approach, as long as the borrower 
provides the lender with notice before TILA’s three-year period, 
the borrower can file a rescission claim after that three-year 
period.238 By extending the borrower’s ability to bring actions 
after the three-year period, the Notice-Only Approach 
                                                                                                     
 232. Id. (citation omitted). 
 233. See id. at 733 (“TILA contains no language even hinting that a lawsuit 
is required to exercise the right of rescission. Neither TILA nor Regulation Z 
mention at any point the need for a court filing.”). 
 234. See id. (referring to TILA and Regulation Z and stating that “[t]he plain 
language of the statute and the regulation both unambiguously require only 
written notice to effectuate rescission” (emphasis added)). 
 235. See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text (describing the effect of 
a statute of repose). 
 236. See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 417 (1998) (stating that 
TILA’s rescission provision “govern[s] the life of the underlying right” and talks 
“of a right’s duration” in “straightforward” terms). 
 237. See id. at 419 (“We respect Congress’s manifest intent by concluding 
that the Act permits no federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after 
the 3-year period of § 1635(f) has run.” (emphasis added)). 
 238. See Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 
2012) (recognizing that the borrowers exercised their right of rescission by 
providing notice to the creditor before TILA’s three-year period and therefore the 
borrowers could file suit after TILA’s three-year period expired). 
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undermines the Court’s classification of TILA’s rescission 
provision as a statute of repose and violates the purpose of a 
statute of repose to function as an absolute time limit. Unlike the 
Notice-Only Approach, the Notice-and-Filing Approach 
harmonizes the Court’s Beach decision and the purpose of a 
statute of repose by requiring borrowers to provide notice and file 
suit before the three-year period expires. 
4. The Equitable Remedy of Rescission 
Advocates of the Notice-and-Filing Approach compare TILA’s 
right of rescission to common-law rescission because, in both 
contexts, rescission functions as an equitable remedy that 
restores the parties to the status quo ante.239 Stated differently, 
rescission restores the parties to their precontractual positions by 
requiring each party to return what she received from the other 
party.240 In TILA’s rescission context, restoring the parties to the 
status quo ante involves the borrower returning the lender’s loan 
proceeds and the lender releasing its security interest in the 
borrower’s principal dwelling.241 
                                                                                                     
 239. See Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1183 (10th Cir. 
2012) (“Rescission in its most basic form is an equitable remedy designed to 
return the parties to the status quo prevailing before the existence of an 
underlying contract.”); Shepard, supra note 35, at 222 (“[C]ourts have concluded 
that, in one respect, TILA rescission and common law rescission are 
coterminous: both attempt to return the parties to the status quo ante.”). Note 
that “status quo ante” is defined as “[t]he situation that existed before 
something else (being discussed) occurred.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (8th 
ed. 2004). 
 240. See Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 265 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(“One of the goals of § 1635 is ‘to return the parties most nearly to the position 
they held prior to entering into the transaction.’” (citation omitted)); Rosenfield, 
681 F.3d at 1184 (“And to effectuate a rescission in the general remedial sense 
means that ‘each party [must] return to the other what he has received from the 
other by way of contractual performance.’” (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted)). 
 241. See Shepard, supra note 35, at 189 (“TILA, moreover, allows borrowers 
who have suffered a material disclosure violation to unwind the loan transaction 
up to three years following the loan closing.”); id. at 190 
Under TILA, after the borrower notifies the lender or its assignee of 
her intent to rescind, section 1635(b) and its implementing regulation 
require the lender to cancel its security interest in the borrower’s 
home. Only after the creditor complies with its obligations under the 
1964 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1925 (2014) 
Because rescission’s equitable goal involves restoring the 
parties to the status quo ante, Notice-and-Filing Approach 
supporters argue that rescission is not appropriate when 
achieving the status quo ante becomes too difficult.242 However, 
the Notice-Only Approach allows the borrower to provide the 
lender with notice then file suit after TILA’s three-year period.243 
Allowing the borrower to file a rescission suit after the three-year 
period allows more time to pass, thereby increasing the likelihood 
that the underlying circumstances of both parties will have 
substantially changed.244 For example, a new creditor may have 
obtained a security interest in the principal dwelling.245 The 
increased likelihood of changes in the underlying circumstances 
complicates restoring the status quo ante, thereby frustrating the 
goal of rescission as an equitable remedy.246 In contrast, the 
Notice-and-Filing Approach recognizes that TILA provides the 
borrower with a “generous three-year repose period”247 during 
which the borrower and lender can, with relative ease, achieve 
the status quo ante before the underlying circumstances change 
too much. 
                                                                                                     
statute must the consumer return the net loan proceeds (the loan 
principal minus all costs and finance charges paid by the consumer 
over the loan term) to the creditor. (footnotes omitted). 
 242. See Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1184 (“The primary justification of 
rescission, however, is ‘remedial economy’ . . . . Consequently, it is not an 
appropriate remedy in circumstances where its application would lead to 
prohibitively difficult (or impossible) enforcement.”). 
 243. See id. at 1185 (stating that under the Notice-Only Approach, a 
borrower can provide written notice to a lender then “decide[] later—at some 
unknown, and perhaps distant, point in the future—to effectuate the rescission 
right through judicial process”). 
 244. See id. (“[I]t is self-evident that when a borrower who has provided 
notice to a creditor decides later—at some unknown, and perhaps distant, point 
in the future—to effectuate the rescission right through judicial process, the 
underlying circumstances in no small number of cases are likely to have 
changed significantly.”). 
 245. See id. (“Just to provide one example: new actors may have come onto 
the field post-transaction and obtained some interest in the loan or the 
underlying property.”). 
 246. See id. (“And, as a consequence of this reality, enforcement would likely 
be costly and difficult. In short, such an outcome is not consistent with the 
general goal and application of a rescission remedy.” (footnote omitted)). 
 247. Id. at 1187. 
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One scholar suggests that TILA and common-law rescission 
are different because TILA liberalizes many of the common-law 
rescission requirements.248 For example, because TILA imposes 
strict liability on lenders for disclosure violations, borrowers do 
not have to plead their TILA rescission claims with 
particularity.249 Furthermore, a borrower using the common law’s 
right of rescission could not likely rescind a loan transaction 
years after the closing.250 Therefore, distinctions exist between 
rescission in the TILA versus the common law context. 
While undoubtedly these differences exist, they strengthen 
the argument for the Notice-and-Filing Approach. By relaxing the 
pleading standard for rescission claims, TILA makes it easier for 
borrowers to validly exercise rescission in qualifying transactions. 
Furthermore, by giving the borrower a longer length of time to 
exercise rescission than would be allowed in the common-law 
context, TILA increases a borrower’s bargaining power with the 
lender. Accordingly, both changes from the common law’s 
rescission favor borrowers. Therefore, the Notice-and-Filing 
Approach’s requirement that borrowers provide notice and file 
suit within three years merely maintains the balance in the 
borrower–lender relationship by not allowing borrowers to retain 
indefinitely the right to enjoy these relaxed provisions. 
5. The Notice-Only Approach Clouds Title 
The Notice-and-Filing Approach limits the uncertainty of 
title in the context of TILA’s rescission. As a general matter, 
rescission can negatively affect, or cloud, title to the principal 
dwelling—it remains unclear who has title and whether the title 
is still encumbered by the security interest.251 However, as the 
                                                                                                     
 248. See Shepard, supra note 35, at 189 (“TILA substantially liberalizes 
these [common-law] requirements.”). 
 249. See id. (“TILA substantially liberalizes these [common-law] 
requirements. TILA rescission claims need not be pleaded with particularity. 
TILA violations are measured by a strict liability standard. Consequently, 
creditors will be liable even for ‘technical or minor’ violations.”). 
 250. Id. (“It is unlikely that a borrower seeking to rescind under the common 
law could bring a rescission action one, two, or three years following the loan 
transaction, as TILA’s rescission provisions permit.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 251. See Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1186–87 (10th Cir. 
1966 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1925 (2014) 
Beach Court indicated, Congress chose to limit the potential 
duration of clouded title by imposing a three-year time limit for 
exercising rescission in TILA.252 By requiring borrowers to 
provide notice and file suit within TILA’s three-year period, the 
Notice-and-Filing Approach respects the limit on clouded title 
that Congress prescribed in TILA. 
Supporters of the Notice-and-Filing Approach criticize the 
Notice-Only Approach because it creates further uncertainty 
regarding title to the principal dwelling.253 By giving a borrower 
the unilateral power of rescission through notice and by allowing 
a borrower to wait indefinitely to file suit,254 the Notice-Only 
Approach extends the amount of time a borrower can exercise 
rescission, thereby furthering uncertainty in regards to title.255 
Two responses exist to support the Notice-Only Approach in 
regards to the clouded title problem. First, a state statute of 
limitations will impose a time limit on when a borrower can file 
suit,256 thereby preventing the borrower from waiting 
indefinitely. Second, lenders can clear a clouded title by filing 
                                                                                                     
2012) (stating that “rescission has the capacity to negatively affect the certainty 
of title in a foreclosure sale—and potentially thereafter”). 
 252. See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 418–19 (1998) (“Since a 
statutory rescission right could cloud a bank’s title on foreclosure, Congress may 
well have chosen to circumscribe that risk . . . .”). 
 253. See Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1186 (“Contrary to the statute’s concerns, as 
expressed in its language, Ms. Rosenfield’s reading would allow the right of 
rescission to operate broadly to ‘cloud a bank’s title on foreclosure’ . . . .” (citation 
omitted)). 
 254. See supra note 243 and accompanying text (describing how, under the 
Notice-Only Approach, a borrower can wait indefinitely to file suit as long as she 
provided the lender with notice within TILA’s three-year period). 
 255. See Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1186 (stating that the Notice-Only 
Approach “would permit the time period for solidifying the legal relationship 
between lenders and borrowers to be effectively enlarged . . . .”); id. at 1187 
[A]ccepting a consumer’s unilateral notice of an intent to rescind as a 
legally effective exercise of rescission, where the creditor has not in 
any sense actually acted on the consumer’s wishes, would indirectly 
enlarge the congressionally established three-year time period under 
TILA, and it could work to cloud the title of the property for an 
indefinite period of time. (footnote omitted). 
 256. See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text (describing how courts 
can apply a state statute of limitations where a federal statute does not provide 
one, thereby preventing a borrower from waiting indefinitely to file suit under 
TILA). 
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suit.257 For example, a lender who believes the borrower has 
invalidly exercised rescission can sue to confirm the invalidity 
rather than wait and see if the borrower will file suit first.258 In 
sum, the Notice-Only Approach prevents an indefinite period of 
clouded title because state statutes of limitations will apply and 
lenders have the option to file suit. 
The Notice-Only Approach’s state-statutes-of-limitations 
argument, however, fails to solve the clouded-title problem. 
Although a state statute of limitations would admittedly prevent 
a borrower from waiting indefinitely to file suit, the state statute 
could potentially extend the borrower’s ability to file suit past 
TILA’s three-year period. For example, assume an applicable 
state statute-of-limitations period is five years. Under the Notice-
Only Approach, the borrower in this state could provide the 
lender with notice then wait two years after TILA’s three-year 
period and still file a valid claim. The potential for a state statute 
of limitations to extend TILA’s three-year period can lead to 
further clouding of title. 
The Notice-Only Approach’s argument that the lender can 
clear a clouded title by filing suit undermines the argument that 
the Notice-Only Approach conserves judicial resources. 
Supporters of the Notice-Only Approach argue that the Notice-
and-Filing Approach incentivizes borrowers to involve courts in 
rescission immediately rather than trying to engage in private 
negotiations with lenders.259 To clear title, however, Notice-Only 
                                                                                                     
 257. See Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 265 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(“A lender who believes an obligor’s notice of rescission is invalid may choose to 
file suit to resolve any uncertainty.”); id. at 266–67 (“Once alerted to the cloud 
on its title, a lender could sue to confirm that the obligor’s rescission was invalid 
or do nothing and assume the risk that a court might later rule that the 
rescission was valid.”); Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 734 (8th Cir. 
2013) (Murphy, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[L]enders are free to file a 
declaratory or quiet title action at any time to establish conclusively whether a 
homeowner’s exercise of his right of rescission is valid. In other words, the 
‘cloud’ on title lasts precisely so long as the lender wishes it to last.”). 
 258. See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 266–67 (“[L]enders in these circumstances 
have options to resolve that uncertainty. Once alerted to the cloud on its title, a 
lender could sue to confirm that the obligor’s rescission was invalid or do 
nothing and assume the risk that a court might later rule that the rescission 
was valid.”). 
 259. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (criticizing the Notice-and-
Filing Approach because it encourages consumers to involve courts immediately 
instead of trying to first enter into private negotiations with the lender to avoid 
1968 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1925 (2014) 
supporters suggest the lender should file suit.260 Does this 
argument not incentivize lenders to involve courts in rescission 
immediately? It seems this argument discourages lenders from 
entering into private negotiations with borrowers, thereby 
undermining the conservation of judicial resources argument. 
6. The Notice-Only Approach Increases Costs for All Parties 
Supporters of the Notice-and-Filing Approach argue that the 
Notice-Only Approach disproportionately favors borrowers.261 By 
disproportionately favoring borrowers, the Notice-Only Approach 
detrimentally affects lenders in two ways. First, lenders will 
likely file suit to resolve clouded title problems262 or to prevent a 
borrower from “pre-filing” their rescission claim,263 thereby 
imposing litigation costs on lenders as well as borrowers. Second, 
lenders will incur the cost of providing an interest-free, fee-free 
mortgage to a borrower who validly rescinds a loan.264 Lenders 
will then pass these costs on to future borrowers, thus increasing 
costs for all parties involved in loan transactions.265 
                                                                                                     
courts altogether). 
 260. See supra note 258 and accompanying text (stating that a lender who 
believes a borrower has invalidly exercised rescission has the option to file suit 
to clear title). 
 261. See supra notes 174–86 (stating that the Notice-Only Approach 
provides a borrower with a unilateral power to rescind and allows them to file 
suit after TILA’s three-year period). 
 262. See supra note 258 and accompanying text (providing the Notice-Only 
supporters’ argument that lenders can file suit to clear title rather than wait for 
the borrower to act). 
 263. See ABA Brief, supra note 172, at *9 (“The lender’s only option to avoid 
this problem will be to litigate the matter itself, immediately upon receiving the 
rescission notice, by bringing its own costly action every time a rescission notice 
is filed—even if the notice is facially without merit.”). 
 264. See id. at *14 (“By permitting a borrower to rescind upon notice, the 
borrower can pre-file a notice and then—years later—seek the return of all of 
their payments and interest, having lived rent-free at the expense of the 
lender.”). 
 265. See id. at *15 (stating that the Notice-Only Approach “will increase the 
costs to lenders . . . these costs will be borne by borrowers at the closing 
table. . . . And TILA rescission serves an ‘insurance function for consumers’ that 
‘increase[s] the seller’s marginal costs,’ which will ‘tend to raise the price’ for the 
loan.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. 
Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 267 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[P]ermitting obligors to rescind by 
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Supporters of the Notice-Only Approach recognize the 
potential for increased costs.266 However, they argue that an 
increase in costs does not justify disregarding TILA’s text.267 In 
fact, many of TILA’s regulations increase costs, not just the right 
of rescission.268 Finally, Congress—not the courts—determines 
these costs.269 
7. The Judiciary’s Involvement Benefits All Parties 
The Notice-and-Filing Approach requires the judiciary’s 
involvement, which benefits all parties involved in the loan 
transaction. First, all parties can benefit from a court’s equitable 
powers under TILA to modify the borrower’s repayment 
obligations.270 Because TILA requires the borrower to return the 
loan proceeds to the lender during rescission,271 financially 
burdened borrowers may not have the means to fulfill this 
obligation.272 However, requiring the borrower to file suit means a 
court can provide the borrower with the option to set up 
installment payments with reasonable interest rates over several 
                                                                                                     
written notice could potentially impose additional costs on banks . . . . This may, 
in turn, be more costly for borrowers insofar as lenders—like all businesses—
pass along costs occasioned by regulation or taxation to their customers.”). 
 266. See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 264 (stating that supporters of the Notice-and-
Filing Approach “argue that this interpretation may create increased 
uncertainty with respect to title, and could increase costs for both lenders and 
consumers. We find . . . [this] concern, while likely valid, does not permit us to 
disregard the text of § 1635”). 
 267. See id. at 267 (“[T]he fact that this approach may be more costly is not, 
in and of itself, a reason to disregard the text of the statute.”). 
 268. See id. (“Many TILA regulations increase costs for lenders (and, in 
turn, consumers) . . . .”). 
 269. See id. (“[I]t is for Congress—not the courts—to determine whether 
those increases are warranted.”). 
 270. See Shepard, supra note 35, at 182 (“There are significant benefits for 
all stakeholders—borrowers, lenders, and communities alike—associated with 
modifying repayment obligations.”). 
 271. See supra note 241 and accompanying text (stating that, under TILA, a 
borrower provides the lender with rescission notice, the lender cancels the 
security interest in the principal dwelling, and then the borrower must return 
the net loan proceeds). 
 272. See Shepard, supra note 35, at 222 (“When borrowers are underwater 
and unable to tender either through a refinancing or a sale of the home, they are 
incapable of restoring the lender to its pre-mortgage loan transaction position.”). 
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years.273 These installment payments benefit all parties by 
reducing harmful foreclosures.274 
Second, a court following the Notice-and-Filing Approach can 
mediate the “hostage exchange” relationship between a borrower 
and lender during rescission.275 In a rescission scenario, the 
borrower will be reluctant to return the loan proceeds to the 
lender because the borrower will lose her bargaining power.276 
Similarly, a lender will be reluctant to release its security 
interest in the borrower’s property because the lender will 
become an unsecured creditor and lien creditors can attach to the 
collateral.277 Because both parties have strong incentives to keep 
their leverage or “hostage,”278 a court can step in to referee the 
rescission.279 
                                                                                                     
 273. See id. at 182 (“Non-bankruptcy courts, which handle the vast majority 
of TILA rescission actions, should use their equitable authority under TILA to 
modify borrowers’ repayment obligations by allowing borrowers to tender in 
installments, over a period of years, and at reasonable interest rates.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 274. See id. at 182–83 (“[M]odify[ing] borrowers’ repayment obligations . . . 
reduces foreclosures that harm borrowers, lenders, and communities and 
ensures that TILA’s consumer-protective mandate will remain viable even in a 
depressed housing market.”). 
 275. See id. at 190 (“The rescission process set forth in the statute in many 
ways resembles a hostage exchange . . . .”). 
 276. See id. (“If the borrower tenders to a creditor who refuses to release its 
security interest in the borrower’s home, the borrower . . . [has] relinquished a 
large lump sum of cash and all of her bargaining power . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 277. See id. at 190–91 (“[I]f the lender releases its security interest before 
the borrower tenders, the lender is rendered a vulnerable, unsecured creditor, 
whose collateral is subject to attachment by lien creditors.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 278. See id. at 190 (“[E]ach captor (the borrower or creditor) is reluctant to 
give up her hostage (the tender obligation or security interest, respectively) 
before the other party complies, since unrequited release risks a near-complete 
loss of leverage.”). 
 279. See Daniel Rothstein, Comment, Truth in Lending: The Right to 
Rescind and the Statute of Limitations, 14 PACE L. REV. 633, 636 (1994) (stating 
that TILA provides “specific procedures that the creditor must follow if the 
consumer rescinds” but recognizes that “[c]ourts are specifically authorized to 
modify the procedure in equity”). 
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C. Recommending the Notice-and-Filing Approach 
The post-Beach TILA rescission landscape contains two 
important elements. First, under certain conditions, TILA’s 
rescission statute gives a borrower an extended right of rescission 
for three years.280 Second, under the Supreme Court’s Beach 
decision, TILA’s rescission statute functions as a statute of 
repose, which completely terminates a borrower’s ability to 
exercise rescission after the three-year period.281 When choosing 
between the Notice-Only and the Notice-and-Filing Approach, 
courts should consider which approach remains compatible with 
this landscape. 
The Notice-Only Approach remains incompatible with the 
Beach Court’s characterization of TILA’s rescission as a statute of 
repose. Notice-Only supporters admit that, if the borrower 
provides the lender with notice within TILA’s three-year period, 
then the borrower can file suit after the three-year period, subject 
to applicable state statutes of limitations.282 Notice-Only 
supporters justify this conclusion by drawing a distinction 
between exercising and confirming rescission, where filing suit 
after the three-year period merely confirms that a valid rescission 
occurred.283 Remember that a statute of repose “terminates any 
right” to action or recovery after the time period expires.284 But 
how can a borrower file suit after TILA’s three-year time period 
expires if all of her rights under the statute of repose have 
already terminated? Logic dictates that a borrower cannot retain 
                                                                                                     
 280. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text (stating that borrowers 
have an extended right of rescission that lasts for three years after loan 
consummation if the lender fails to take certain actions). 
 281. See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 417 (1998) (stating that 
TILA’s rescission provision “govern[s] the life of the underlying right” to bring 
suit and talks of “a right’s duration”); Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 
1172, 1182 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating that Beach categorized TILA’s rescission 
provision as a strict repose period “that operates to completely extinguish the 
right being claimed after it lapses”). 
 282. See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text (stating that courts 
have a policy of applying a state statute of limitations to a federal law lacking a 
limitations period and this practice will prevent borrowers from waiting 
indefinitely to file suit).  
 283. See supra Part IV.A.8 (arguing that a barrower can to provide notice 
before yet file suit after TILA’s three-year rescission period). 
 284. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 24 (2013). 
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a right to file suit after the statute of repose’s three-year period 
expires under TILA rescission. By contradicting the statute of 
repose articulated in Beach, the Notice-Only Approach fails to 
adhere to the post-Beach TILA rescission landscape. 
In addition to theoretical concerns, extending a borrower’s 
ability to file suit after TILA’s three-year period, for any reason, 
leads to grave practical consequences. First, a borrower’s 
extended time makes it much more difficult to restore the parties 
to the status quo ante, thus frustrating the equitable nature of 
rescission.285 Second, TILA’s three-year period already clouds the 
principal dwelling’s title286 and extending a borrower’s time to file 
suit exacerbates this problem. Third, increased costs will result 
for all parties as lenders pass on the expenses they incur by 
providing interest-free, fee-free mortgages and filing suit to 
address clouded title problems as well as pre-filed rescission 
attempts.287 Because of theoretical and practical concerns, courts 
should not adopt the Notice-Only Approach. 
In contrast, the Notice-and-Filing Approach respects the 
post-Beach TILA rescission landscape. Under this approach, if a 
borrower does not provide notice and file suit within TILA’s 
three-year period, then the borrower’s rescissions rights expire.288 
This notion adheres to the Supreme Court’s statute-of-repose 
classification because the borrower’s rights expire when TILA’s 
three-year time period ends, rather than extending beyond. By 
aligning with the statute of repose articulated in Beach, the 
Notice-and-Filing Approach fits neatly into the post-Beach TILA 
rescission landscape. 
                                                                                                     
 285. See supra Part IV.B.4 (stating that restoring the parties to the status 
quo ante—one of the goals of equitable rescission—becomes more difficult to 
achieve as time passes). 
 286. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (describing the ability of 
rescission to cause uncertainty on title). 
 287. See supra notes 262–65 and accompanying text (stating that the Notice-
Only Approach will increase lenders’ costs and that lenders will pass along these 
costs to borrowers); ABA Brief, supra note 172, at *9 (stating that “borrowers 
will have no disincentive to attempt a meritless rescission; they will be free to 
file their notice and wait”). 
 288. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (providing a court’s 
determination that a borrower must file suit for rescission before TILA’s three-
year period expires). 
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As a practical matter, the Notice-and-Filing Approach 
maintains the balance in the borrower–lender relationship. 
Although TILA exists as a remedial statute favoring borrowers,289 
rescission within TILA stands as an equitable remedy designed to 
balance the interests of both parties.290 TILA’s rescission, in 
conjunction with the Notice-and-Filing Approach, adheres to 
rescission’s equitable nature. Under TILA rescission, the 
borrower benefits from relaxed rescission standards (as compared 
to the common law) 291 and a generous three-year rescission 
period.292 By providing the borrower with these benefits, TILA 
gives the borrower bargaining power over the lender.293 Under 
the Notice-and-Filing Approach, the borrower’s benefits are 
limited by the three-year statute of repose, which extinguishes 
the borrower’s rescission rights while limiting the potential for 
clouded title.294 By limiting the borrower’s benefits, the Notice-
and-Filing Approach prevents the borrower from abusing her 
bargaining power to the detriment of the lender and ultimately, 
the lending market. Without the Notice-and-Filing Approach’s 
limits on the borrower’s benefits, the borrower would have a 
disproportionate amount of power over the lender,295 resulting in 
                                                                                                     
 289. See supra Part IV.A.5 (identifying the Notice-Only Approach argument 
that TILA must be construed to favor borrowers because it is a remedial 
statute). 
  290. See supra Part IV.B.4 (describing the Notice-and-Filing Approach 
argument that rescission is an equitable remedy designed to return both parties 
to the status quo ante). 
 291. See Shepard, supra note 35, at 223 (“TILA substantially relaxes the 
requirements for seeking relief under the common law and imposes liability on 
lenders on a strict liability basis in order to encourage lenders to disclose the 
key terms of mortgage loan transactions clearly, consistently, and completely.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 292. See supra note 250 and accompanying text (describing the borrower’s 
right to bring a TILA rescission claim up to three years after loan 
consummation and how that ability is not likely under the common law). 
 293. See Shepard, supra note 35, at 223 (stating that TILA rescission 
represents “a private right of action with a severe remedy” and encourages 
consumers to “police the marketplace”). 
 294. See supra note 252 and accompanying text (stating that the Beach 
Court recognized Congress’s concern of limiting TILA’s rescission because of the 
potential to cloud title). 
 295. See ABA Brief supra note 172, at *12 (“Congress anticipated that 
borrowers would receive a measure of relief, but not by warping the rescission 
rights into a never-ending cause of action.”); id. at *9 (stating that the Notice-
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increased costs that will ultimately affect all parties, including 
the borrower.296 Therefore, TILA, coupled with the Notice-and-
Filing Approach, maintain the balance mandated by equitable 
rescission. 
Although strong theoretical and practical arguments justify 
the Notice-and-Filing Approach, Notice-Only supporters do raise 
three concerns that merit attention. First, and perhaps the 
strongest, involves the concern that TILA’s text and structure 
never reference filing a lawsuit in regards to exercising 
rescission.297 However, this structural argument fails when 
comparing TILA’s three-day and three-year rescission. 
Specifically, a justiciability concern explains the exercise of three-
day rescission without filing suit but this same concern is absent 
in the three-year rescission context.298 Accordingly, the structure 
of TILA remains unhelpful in justifying the Notice-Only 
Approach. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the 
text of a statute should not be interpreted in a vacuum, but 
instead should be considered based on the entire law’s policy and 
objective.299 Accordingly, the post-Beach TILA rescission 
landscape justifies adopting the Notice-and-Filing Approach 
because it prevents the borrower from circumventing TILA’s 
three-year statute of repose. Furthermore, rescission’s equitable 
nature also supports the Notice-and-Filing Approach by 
balancing both parties’ interests.300  
                                                                                                     
and-Filing Approach’s “requirement of litigation imposes some discipline on 
potential plaintiffs, requiring them to consider whether it is worth investing 
time and money in futile claims”). 
 296. See supra note 265 and accompanying text (stating that the increased 
cost to lenders will be passed on to borrowers in future loan transactions). 
 297. See supra Part IV.A.1–2 (recognizing that TILA’s text explicitly 
requires written notice, the text makes no reference to filing suit in the 
rescission context, and the statute’s structure suggests that lawsuits are not 
necessary to exercise rescission). 
 298. See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text (noting that a lawsuit 
requirement for TILA’s three-day rescission would create standing problems 
that are not present in TILA’s three-year rescission context). 
 299. See U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 
439, 455 (1993) (stating that the Supreme Court, when “expounding a 
statute . . . must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but 
look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy”). 
 300. See supra Part IV.B.4 (stating that one of rescission’s equitable goals 
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Second, although the CFPB, a major player in the lending 
industry, interprets TILA as supporting the Notice-Only 
Approach,301 courts are not required to give a federal agency’s 
interpretation Chevron deference when the statute is 
unambiguous.302 Furthermore, one circuit court has refused to 
give CFPB’s Regulation Z Chevron deference before,303 suggesting 
the CFPB’s interpretations have been previously unpersuasive. 
Accordingly, the CFPB’s support of the Notice-Only Approach is 
not dispositive on the issue of how the Supreme Court should 
resolve the circuit split. 
Third, the Notice-Only Approach conserves judicial resources 
by encouraging borrowers to enter into private negotiations with 
lenders, as opposed to immediately seeking judicial 
intervention.304 However, TILA’s litigation history indicates that 
lenders “routinely” ignore borrower’s notice or deny they have 
violated TILA.305 Therefore, regardless of the approach chosen, 
the parties will frequently involve courts to determine the 
rescission’s validity.306 Furthermore, the borrower’s principal 
dwelling represents the security interest at stake in TILA’s 
                                                                                                     
involves restoring both parties to the status quo ante). 
 301. See supra Part IV.A.4 (arguing that the CFPB’s endorsement 
strengthens support for adoption of the Notice-Only Approach). 
 302. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (explaining Chevron 
deference). 
 303. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (describing a case where a 
circuit court of appeals refused to give Chevron deference to a CFPB 
interpretation because it conflicted with TILA’s text). 
 304. See supra Part IV.A.7 (implying that the Notice-Only Approach saves 
judicial resources because it does not incentivize borrowers to involve courts in 
rescission immediately). 
 305. See Shepard, supra note 35, at 193 (“Although TILA allows consumers 
to initiate the rescission process without a court’s intervention merely by 
sending a cancellation notice to the holder of the note, creditors routinely ignore 
the rescission notice or respond by denying that they have violated the statute.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 734 (8th Cir. 
2013) (Murphy, J., concurring and dissenting) (“No doubt borrowers may 
sometimes make rescission claims without any valid basis, but lenders may also 
deny them without legal right or might take advantage of uninformed 
consumers.”). 
 306. See Shepard, supra note 35, at 193 (“[E]ven though rescission under 
TILA is a ‘non-judicial’ remedy, courts frequently are forced to decide whether or 
not the lender has committed a violation triggering a borrower’s right of 
rescission.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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rescission context.307 For public policy reasons, would it not be 
wiser to involve courts, as a mediator, when a borrower risks 
losing her principal dwelling? Due to the likelihood of court 
involvement for either approach and the presence of the 
borrower’s principal dwelling, it appears the wiser approach may 
be to involve the courts in every exercise of rescission to protect 
the borrower. 
V. Conclusion 
As the economy recovers from the Great Recession, 
nonpurchase transactions, such as home-equity loans, are on the 
rise.308 Many borrowers will meet the requisite conditions and 
qualify for TILA’s three-day right of rescission.309 Furthermore, if 
lenders are not providing these borrowers with a right-to-rescind 
notice along with TILA’s required material disclosures, then 
TILA extends the borrower’s right of rescission to three years.310 
Until the Supreme Court resolves the circuit split, lenders 
should proceed with caution—especially if they operate in a 
jurisdiction that follows the Notice-Only Approach. Borrowers in 
notice-only jurisdictions can employ the nuclear option: send the 
lender a notice of rescission before TILA’s three-year period then 
wait and file suit afterwards.311 In response, lenders should pay 
                                                                                                     
 307. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (identifying conditions for 
TILA’s rescission right, including that the borrower’s principal dwelling secures 
the loan). 
 308. See Christine Layton, As Homeowner Equity Rebounds, Home Equity 
Loans Return, U.S. FINANCE POST (Jan. 21, 2014), http://usfinancepost.com/as-
homeowner-equity-rebounds-home-equity-loans-return-
12487.html#CrVSGTL46HeQx2gQ.99 (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (stating home 
equity loan activity “increased 30.8% during the first nine months of 2013” as 
compared to 2012 and that new home equity lending is expected to reach $60 
billion in 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 309. See supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text (providing the three 
conditions that must be met for borrowers to qualify for TILA’s right of 
rescission). 
 310. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (stating that a borrower’s 
rescission extends to three years under TILA if the lender fails to deliver 
required material disclosures or the right to rescind notice). 
 311. See supra notes 125–33 and accompanying text (providing a 
representative case where a rescinding borrower provided the lender with notice 
before and filed suit after TILA’s three-year period, yet the court held that the 
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careful attention to communications sent by borrowers, as they 
may be exercising rescission. Furthermore, lenders may want to 
consider filing suit to seek to clear problems associated with 
clouded title on the security interest. Hopefully, courts will join 
the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits 
in adopting the Notice-and-Filing Approach so the borrower–
lender relationship will remain balanced, in accordance with 
rescission’s equitable nature. 
  
                                                                                                     
borrower validly exercised rescission). 
